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Expatriation in the United States:
Precept and Practice Today and
Yesterday
ALAN G. JAMES*
Holmes wrote that in order to know what the law is, we must
know what it has been, and what it tends to become. 1990 is a felici-
tous occasion to cast a backward glance and reflect on the profound
changes that have occurred in the precept and practice of expatria-
tion in the United States. Ten years have passed since the Supreme
Court delivered its landmark decision of Vance v. Terrazas. The Na-
tionality Act of 1940, the first all embracing compilation of statutory
and common law provisions on nationality and expatriation became
law half a century ago. And seventy-five years ago this past summer,
Henry James, foremost American novelist of his time, forfeited
United States citizenship by obtaining naturalization in Britain.'
James' transfer of allegiance to the King of England in the second
year of the Great War, unquestionably a voluntary act done with the
intention of relinquishing United States citizenship, aroused lively
interest in both Britain and the United States; enthusiastic approval
in the former, censure in the latter. The event is an evocative episode
in the annals of expatriation in America, not only because of the
illustrious personage involved but also because of the reasons that led
James to elect British nationality. American citizens who have
* B.A. 1943, Williams College; LL.B. 1947 Yale Law School. Mr. James retired
from the Foreign Service in 1980 and in February 1982 was appointed Chairman of the
Board of Appellate Review. The opinions expressed in this Article are the author's and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of State or members of the Board.
1. For this author's essay regarding the loss of Henry James' American citizenship,
see James, A Memorable Naturalization: How Henry James Became a British Subject
and Lost [H/is United States Citizenship, in THE HENRY JAMES REvIEw 55 (1991).
Alan James has no kinship to Henry James.
853
adopted another country as their own, primarily in response to the
dictates of conscience are rare indeed. Simply put, James decided to
become British to make a gesture of support at a time when Britain
was fighting a cause which James believed should be the cause of the
United States.
In his application for naturalization, which was approved in record
time (Prime Minister Asquith was a sponsor), James eloquently ex-
plained why he decided to become British:
Because of his having lived and worked in England for the best part of forty
years, because of his attachment to the country and his sympathy with it
and its people, because of the long friendships and associations and interests
he had formed there- these last including the acquisition of some prop-
erty-all of which things have brought to a head his desire to throw his
moral weight and personal allegiance, for whatever they may be worth, into
the scale of the contending nation's present and future fortune.2
Not only did James acquire British nationality unusually quickly,
he lost his United States citizenship just as fast. Under the provi-
sions of the American expatriation statute then in effect, loss of citi-
zenship occurred automatically once it was established that a citizen
had obtained naturalization in a foreign state.3
James' expatriation is an instructive reference point in this com-
parison of present-day law, regulations and procedures with those of
earlier times. Here the focus is on four major facets of expatriation:
processing and documentation of loss of nationality cases; develop-
ment of the role of the Department of State in expatriation; the con-
stituent elements of a determination of loss of nationality; and ad-
ministrative and judicial review of holdings of loss of citizenship
made by the Department of State.
The history of expatriation in the United States has been one of
slow but inexorable movement toward affirmation of the right of a
United States citizen to remain a citizen unless he or she manifests
an intention to terminate citizenship. In contrast to the remote and
not so remote past, American citizens today enjoy a multitude of
safeguards against arbitrary administrative action with respect to
their citizenship. The rules, regulations and procedures for process-
ing and determining loss of nationality cases, as well as the statutory
right of administrative and judicial review of decisions of loss of na-
tionality, give procedural protection to the Constitution's grant of
citizenship.
2. "The Humble Memorial of Henry James, an Alien" to the Secretary of State
for the Home Dept., July 5, 1915 (on file at the Public Record Office, London, England).
3. Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 2, 34 Stat. 1228 (1907) (codified at at 8
U.S.C. § 17 (1988)), provided in pertinent part:
That any American citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself when
he has been naturalized in any foreign state in conformity with its laws, or
when he has taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign State.
[VOL 27: 853, 1990] Expatriation in the U.S.
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Several distinct periods mark the search for a widely accepted
public policy on expatriation. In the early days of the Republic, con-
fusion arose from disagreement between the executive and judicial
branches about the basic question of whether the feudal doctrine of
indefeasible allegiance applied in the United States. The courts
tended to the view that, in the absence of a contrary expression by
Congress, expatriation could only occur with the approval of the
State. The executive, concerned about protecting naturalized Ameri-
can citizens against the claims of their birth states, considered expa-
triation a natural right. The issue was settled in 1868 when Congress
declared that expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all peo-
ple. The 14th Amendment to the Constitution, which also was ap-
proved in 1868, defined who is a citizen, but Congress did not then,
or until many years later, define how a citizen might forfeit citizen-
ship. There followed a period of nearly 40 years in which the De-
partment of State, without benefit of legislative mandate, made de-
terminations of loss of nationality.
In 1907 Congress enacted the first general statute prescribing
what acts would result in expatriation. In succeeding years, notably
in 1940 and 1952, Congress lengthened the list of expatriative acts,
as the executive and legislative branches, with approval of the courts,
proscribed, on pain of forfeiture of citizenship, conduct deemed
likely to be prejudicial to foreign relations. In the late 1950s and
during the 1960s the Supreme Court struck down a number of statu-
tory provisions for expatriation as constitutionally infirm. The grand
climacteric of the Supreme Court's examination of the constitutional
limits of Congressional power to enact expatriation legislation came
in 1967 when the Court held that the grant of citizenship of the 14th
Amendment4 is absolute and was designed to protect every citizen
against a forcible destruction of citizenship. After 200 years there is
now in all branches of government a consensus that an American
citizen, natural born or naturalized, has a constitutional right to re-
main a citizen unless he/she voluntarily assents to relinquish
citizenship.
I. PROCESSING AND DOCUMENTATION
The processing and adjudication of putative loss of nationality
cases are governed by law, federal regulations, and elaborate guide-
4. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States are subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside."
lines of the Department of State. The Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 prescribes that whenever a diplomatic or consular officer
has reason to believe that a United States citizen has lost citizenship
by performing a statutory expatriative act in a foreign state, the of-
ficer shall certify the facts upon which such belief is based to the
Department of State, in writing.5 The guidelines of the Department
of State, the Foreign Affairs Manual, spell out how diplomatic and
consular officers should develop and document a potential loss of na-
tionality case.6 Upon learning that a citizen has performed a statu-
tory expatriative act, the officer concerned must inform the citizen
that he or she may have lost citizenship by performance of the par-
ticular expatriative act and invite the person to present evidence for
the Department to consider in determining whether expatriation had
occurred. When the case has been developed, the officer is to execute
a certificate of loss of nationality, attach to it the relevant supporting
documents and recommend whether the certificate should or should
not be approved.7
Upon receipt of the officer's report, the Secretary of State (in
practice, his or her designee) is required to approve or disapprove the
certificate of loss of nationality. 8 The statutory provision that the
Secretary of State shall approve or disapprove a certificate of loss of
nationality is construed by the Department of State to require that
the Secretary review the proceedings and make a reasoned judgment
under the criteria of the Immigration and Nationality Act and judi-
cial decisions whether the citizen expatriated himself or herself.9
5. Immigration and Nationality Act § 358, 8 U.S.C. § 1501 (1988) [hereinafter
"INA"], provides that:
Whenever a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States has reason to
believe that a person while in a foreign state has lost his United States nation-
ality under any provision of chapter 3 of this title, or under any provision of
chapter IV of the Nationality Act of 1940, as amended, he shall certify the
facts upon which such belief is based to the Department of State, in writing,
under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of State. If the report of the
diplomatic or consular officer is approved by the Secretary of State, a copy of
the certificate shall be forwarded to the Attorney General, for his information,
and the diplomatic or consular office in which the report was made shall be
directed to forward a copy of the certificate to the person to whom it relates.
6. U.S. Dept. of State, 7 Foreign Aff. Manual §§ 1210, 1220, & 1250 (1984).
7. Id. § 1220.
8. INA, supra note 4, § 358.
9. Cf. Whitehead v. Haig, 794 F.2d 115, 118 (3rd Cir. 1986). With respect to
INA § 358, 8 U.S.C. § 1501, the court said "the functions required of the various enti-
ties are purely ministerial." The Court continued:
The language of the statute itself does not speak in terms common to those
prescribing administrative procedures. It speaks only in terms directing an au-
tomatic transmittal, for informational purposes, of certified facts related to the
expatriation of a United States citizen. Legislative history of the section con-
firms our view that § 1501 was not intended to provide any mechanism for
administrative adjudication or determination by the Secretary of State as part
of its mandate to approve and issue the Certificate of Loss. In the letter of
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If a certificate of loss of nationality is approved, the Secretary
must send a copy to the Department of Justice for the information of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, thus alerting that De-
partment that a citizen has become an alien and subject to exclusion
or deportation unless properly documented as an alien. The Secre-
tary is also to instruct the foreign service post which prepared the
report to forward a copy to the person to whom it relates.10
Since the cases hold that citizenship is shielded by the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution, the Amendment's injunction that
no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law" requires that an individual whose citizenship rights
are being determined in an administrative proceeding be given ade-
quate notice, an opportunity to be heard before an impartial hearing
officer, and a reasoned final decision based upon a written eviden-
tiary record."'
When Henry James expatriated himself, a person could not be
said to enjoy protection comparable to that to which an expatriated
person is entitled today. In the case of Henry James, once the essen-
tial facts had been established - namely, that he had obtained nat-
uralization in Great Britain in conformity with its laws - he auto-
matically lost his United States citizenship. The Act of March 2,
1907 prescribed that any citizen of the United States would be
"deemed" to have expatriated himself when he obtained naturaliza-
submittal from the President accompanying the proposed Nationality Laws of
the United States dated June 1, 1938, the committee designated by Executive
order to revise and codify the nationality laws into a comprehensive law for
submission to Congress stated the following:
The provisions of Chapter IV, Loss of Nationality, are of special impor-
tance. Loss of nationality is in all cases to result from the existence of
stated facts. In this relation mention may be made to the provisions of
[sec. 1501], in which diplomatic and consular officers are required to send
to the Department of State reports concerning persons found by them to
have committed acts resulting in loss of American nationality under the
provisions of Chapter IV of the proposed act. It is important to note that
such reports are intended merely for the information of the Department of
State, the Department of Labor, and any other branches of the Govern-
ment which may be interested.
Message from the President of the United States, Nationality Laws of the
United States, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. vi (Comm. Print 1938). Apparently,
the purpose and function of § 1501 is that of governmental record-keeping
and notification to the affected person of the existence of such record.
10. INA, supra note 4, § 358.
11. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951);
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); Quon Quon Poy v. Johnson, 273
U.S. 352 (1927).
tion in a foreign state.12
In 1915, diplomatic and consular officers, upon learning that an
American citizen had obtained naturalization in a foreign state (or
performed another act designated by statute as expatriative), were
instructed to certify the facts under their seal and transmit the certi-
fication to the Department of State.13 It was not the custom, as the
Department's guidelines now require, that proceedings be held at the
diplomatic or consular office which certified that a citizen had per-
formed an expatriative act. There were no proceedings in the case of
Henry James. Thus, upon being informed by the British authorities
that James had obtained a certificate of naturalization, Ambassador
Page's sole duty was to certify that fact to the Department. If, how-
ever, the individual involved was a naturalized United States citizen
who had resided in the country of his or her birth for two years or
any other country for five years, there might have been a proceeding
at the diplomatic or consular office concerned. The Act of March 2,
1907 codified a presumption that any such person had ceased to be a
United States citizen, but provided that the presumption might be
"overcome" by the presentation to a diplomatic or consular officer of
facts showing a valid reason for staying abroad and establishing an
intent to return to the United States to reside permanently. 4
12. See supra note 1.
13. The Department Circular from Elihu Root, the Secretary of State, to the Dip-
lomatic and Consular Officers of the United States (April 19, 1907) reads as follows:
Whenever it comes to the knowledge of a diplomatic or consular officer that an
American citizen has secured naturalization in a foreign state in conformity
with its laws,. . such diplomatic or consular officer should certify to the facts
under his seal and should transmit the certificate to this department.
U.S. Dept. of State, Compilation of Certain Departmental Circulars Relating to Citizen-
ship, Registration of American Citizens, Issuance of Passports, etc. (1925).
14. Act of March 2, 1907, § 2 Ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228 (1907) (currently codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 17 (1988)), had the following provision with respect to naturalized citizens:
When any naturalized citizen shall have resided for two years in the foreign
state from which he came, or for five years in any other foreign state it shall be
presumed that he has ceased to be an American citizen, and the place of his
general abode shall be deemed his place of residence during said years: Pro-
vided, however, That such presumption may be overcome on the presentation
of satisfactory evidence to a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States,
under such rules and regulations as the Department of State may prescribe:
And provided also, That no American citizen shall be allowed to expatriate
himself when this country is at war.
As to handling the cases of naturalized citizens who resided abroad in excess of the
time allowed, Root's circular stated that:
If the citizen who has thus acquired foreign naturalization was a naturalized
citizen of the United States, the fact should be stated in the certification and
the certificate of American naturalization should, if possible, be taken up and
forwarded to the department with the certification ....
When a naturalized citizen of the United States has resided for two years in
the country of his origin, or for five years in any other country, this fact creates
a presumption that he has ceased to be an American citizen, but the presump-
tion may be overcome by his presenting to a diplomatic or consular officer
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In 1915 there was no statutory or other prescription that the Sec-
retary of State should take any specific action on the report of a
diplomatic or consular officer. If an officer certified that a proscribed
act had been done, that was the end of the matter.
Neither in 1915 nor in prior years was the Department of State
under any legal mandate, as it is today, to apprise other concerned
agencies that it had made a finding of loss of United States citizen-
ship. Only with enactment of the Nationality Act of 1940 was the
Department of State charged with the responsibility of informing the
Department of Justice that it had made a determination of loss of
citizenship.' 5
Before 1940, there was no statutory provision for the Department
of State to issue a certificate attesting that a person had lost United
States citizenship.' 6 Individuals whom the Department held had ex-
patriated themselves were issued no document as proof of loss of citi-
proof establishing the following facts: ...
In general, the facts to be established were that the naturalized citizen was residing
abroad for business, health or education, and intended to return eventually to the United
States to reside. The evidence to overcome the presumption of expatriation was to be "of
the specific facts and circumstances which bring the alleged citizen under one of the
foregoing heads, and mere assertions, even under oath, that any of the enumerated rea-
sons exist will not be accepted as sufficient."
So much of the instruction as related to residence abroad was not applicable to natu-
ral-born citizens.
The Department's construction of the expatriation presumption changed repeatedly
until 1926 when Secretary of State Kellogg informed the Attorney General that
[i]n view of the diversity of opinion of various Departments of this Govern-
ment, and because of certain decisions of courts which do not appear to accord
entirely with the strict construction of the statute contained in the memoran-
dum mentioned, [the Department of State] has reconsidered this subject and
has come to the conclusion that, in the absence of a decision of the court of last
resort, the presumption of having ceased to be an American citizen arising
under the second paragraph of Section two of the Act of March 2, 1907,
should be regarded as existing only while the naturalized American citizen
against whom such presumption has arisen continues to reside abroad and that
upon his return to the United States and his reestablishment here in good faith
of a permanent residence the reason for which the presumption was created no
longer exists.
III G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 295 (1942) ("Secretary Kellogg to
Attorney General Sargent, Mar. 26, 1926, MS Department of State, file 130/741 b").
The view persisted in the Department, however, that residence abroad should work
expatriation of naturalized citizens, and the Department succeeded in having a provision
for loss of nationality by such persons enacted in the Nationality Act of 1940 from which
the rebuttable presumption was omitted. A substantially similar provision was made in
INA § 352, 8 U.S.C. § 1484 (1988), which the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional
in Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964). See infra note 28.
15. The applicable provision was Nationality Act of 1940 § 501, 54 Stat. 1171
(1940). INA § 358 is virtually identical. Supra note 4.
16. III C. HYDE. INTERNATIONAL LAW § 382, at 1160, n.2 (1945).
zenship. In the latter part of the 19th century and early 20th cen-
tury, United States citizens on occasion asked the Department of
State to issue a certificate, usually requested by a foreign govern-
ment for purposes of naturalization to ensure that the United States
government did not object to the person's change of allegiance. This
the Department consistently refused to do, essentially because issu-
ance of such a document might be interpreted as giving official sanc-
tion to expatriation, and thus in effect, perpetuating the doctrine of
indefeasible allegiance which the United States categorically repudi-
ated in 1868. As Secretary of State Gresham explained in 1894 to
the United States Minister to Russia:
. . I am aware of no statute authorizing or making it the duty of a diplo-
matic or other officer of the United States to give such a certificate. Mr.
Hess' right to abandon his American citizenship, under the laws of this
county, cannot be questioned. This Government holds that the 'right of ex-
patriation is a natural and inherent right of all people' (Rev. Stat. U.S., sec.
1999), and it would seem that by calling the attention of the Imperial Gov-
ernment to that provision Mr. Hess can accomplish his purpose.1 7
II. THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN EXPATRIATION
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 authorizes the Sec-
retary of State to make determinations of loss of nationality by pro-
viding that the Secretary "shall be charged with the administration
and enforcement of the provisions of this Act and all other immigra-
tion and nationality laws relating to. . .(3) the determination of na-
tionality of a person not in the United States." '18 Earlier legislation
also provided a statutory basis for the Secretary of State to make
determinations with respect to nationality.' 9
Before 1907, however, there was no general legislation defining
what acts would constitute expatriation, 20 and during the first eighty
17. III J. MOORE, A Dizsr OF INTERNAMONAL LAW § 466, at 714 (1906) (Mr.
Gresham, Sec. of State, to Mr. White, Min. to Russia, Oct. 2, 1894, For. Rel. 1894,
557).
See also the statement of Secretary Blaine (June 5, 1890) to the Danish Minister
Count Sponneck, that under existing statutes, the Department of State was not compe-
tent "to issue at their request certificates to particular citizens admitting the renunciation
of their allegiance." Id. § 466 at 714-15.
18. INA § 104(a), 8 U.S.C. 1104(a) (1988).
19. The Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1168 (1940); the Act of March
2, 1907, ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228 (1907).
20. The only statutory provision for loss of citizenship in force before 1907 was the
Act of March 3, 1865, §§ 1996 & 1998 of the Revised Statutes, which prescribed that
desertion from the military or naval service, or avoidance of the military draft would
work forfeiture of citizenship.
In 1868 and in succeeding years, the United States concluded a series of treaties, prin-
cipally with a number of European countries, which provided that the citizens of one of
the signatories who obtained naturalization in the other signatory's country would be
recognized by the state of origin as having obtained the nationality of the receiving state.
See infra text accompanying note 39.
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years of the Republic, there was "conflict in precept and confusion in
practice" over nationality and expatriation in the United States,
where ideas of nationality and expatriation were in "ferment."'"
Generally, the executive and judicial branches held differing views
on whether the common law doctrine of indefeasible allegiance ap-
plied in the United States. "In the early days of this Nation," Chief
Justice Warren wrote, "the right of expatriation had been a matter
of controversy," noting that the common law doctrine of perpetual
allegiance was "evident in the opinions of this Court."22 Officials of
the executive branch "were not unwavering in their support of expa-
triation," the Chief Justice added.3
A. Indefeasible Allegiance versus the Right of Expatriation
The naturalization laws of the United States, among our earliest
legislative acts, rested on the principle that one who sought naturali-
zation here had the right to cast off previous allegiance without the
sanction of the country of his or her nativity. Indeed, the signers of
the Declaration of Independence indicated that they considered ex-
patriation indispensable to enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness. In the Declaration's catalog of the "re-
peated injuries and usurpations" of the British King was cited the
fact that he "has endeavored to prevent the population of these
states; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of
Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations
hither."24
From the first, persons naturalized here were required to renounce
their previous nationality. 5 Although officials of the executive
21. Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the Court in Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S.
133, 135 (1952).
22. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 67 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
The opinions cited by the Chief Justice were Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242 (1830), and
Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99 (1830).
"Generally, the federal judges, influenced by the practical desire to maintain a uni-
formity of law in the country, and also being still accustomed to the English legal system,
were inclined to abide by the doctrine of perpetual allegiance." I. TSIANG, THE QUESTION
OF EXPATRIATION IN AMERICA PRIOR TO 1907, 42 (1942) [hereinafter EXPATRIATION].
Tsiang's treatise is a rich source of the evolution of expatriation in the United States
up to enactment of the Act of 1907.
23. Perez, 356 U.S. at 67.
24. The Declaration of Independence para. 9 (U.S. 1776). (This was the seventh of
the "Facts ... submitted to a candid world" by the Signers).
25. There was undeniable force in the assertion of one representative who said in
1797 during the Congressional debate on an expatriation bill: "It would, indeed, be dis-
honorable for us to hold out [the] doctrine [of perpetual allegiance] after inviting people
branch may not have been "unwavering" in their support of the doc-
trine of expatriation during the first eighty years of the Republic,
Secretaries of State with fair consistency upheld the proposition in-
herent in the naturalization laws of the United States that one who
came to the United States and became a citizen had a right to do so
without the prior sanction of his former sovereign or state. And in
the first three-quarters of a century of the Republic a central con-
cern of the Department of State was protection of naturalized Amer-
ican citizens abroad against claims of the state of their nativity to
their services as soldiers or seamen. During this time, Secretaries of
State issued opinions on whether a United States citizen had become
expatriated by performing act inconsistent with United States citi-
zenship. That practice, however, was far less extensive then than in
the last third of the 19th century.
Secretaries of State Jefferson, 6  Marshall, 27  Madison, 28  and
Monroe 29 vigorously defended the view that expatriation is a natural
right. In part to vindicate the principle of the right of expatriation,
the United States went to war in 1812 with Great Britain when Brit-
ish impressment of naturalized American seamen who were born in
Britain became intolerable. When the war ended, British impress-
ment of seamen stopped, and friction between the two countries over
the right of expatriation eased. Over the ensuing fifty years, how-
ever, tension over the issue resurfaced from time to time. For exam-
to come here in crowds from foreign countries." I. TSIANG, EXPATRIATION, supra note
21, at 39, citing ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 352, 5th Cong. 1st Sess.
26. "Our citizens are certainly free to divest themselves of that character by emi-
gration and other acts manifesting their intention, and many then become the subjects of
another power and free to do whatever the subjects of that power may do."
III J. MOORE, supra note 16, at § 434, at 562 ("Mr. Jefferson, Sec. of State, to Mr. G.
Morris, Aug. 16, 1793, 4 Jeff. Works (Washington's ed.), 37").
27. Protesting the failure of Spain to honor an arbitiated award to certain natural-
ized United States citizens, Marshall in 1800 sent the following instruction to the Ameri-
can Minister in Madrid: "The right of naturalizing aliens is claimed and exercised by the
different nations of Europe, as well as by the United States. When the laws adopt an
individual no nation has a right to question the validity of the act, unless it be one which
may have a conflicting title to the person adopted. Spain therefore cannot contest the fact
that these gentlemen are American citizens."
III J. MOORE, supra note 16, at § 434, at 563 ("Mr. Marshall, Sec. of State, to Mr.
Humphreys, Sept. 23, 1800;" Moore, Int. Arbitrations, II. 1001; MS. Inst. U. States
Ministers, V. 383").
28. "There can be no doubt that, on the same principle which admits of aliens
being naturalized in the United States, they may afterwards cast off the character of
American citizen and resume their former allegiance or take that of any other country.
III J. MOORE, supra note 16, at 735 ("Mr. Madison, Sec. of State, to Mr. Murray, June
16, 1803, 1 MS Desp. to Consuls, 168").
29. Monroe told the British Minister at Washington that Great Britain should not
object to United States policy on naturalization. "It is impossible for the United States to
discriminate between their native and naturalized citizens," he said, adding, "Nor ought
your Government to expect it. .. ."
I. TSIANG, EXPATRIATION, 48 ("Monroe to Foster, May 30, 1812, American State Pa-
pers, Foreign Relations, 1789-1828, Il1. 454").
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ple, in 1848 when the British authorities arrested and refused to rec-
ognize as American citizens certain persons born in Ireland but
naturalized in the United States, Secretary of State Buchanan sent
this forceful instruction to the American Minister in London:
Whenever the occasion may require it, you will resist the British doctrine of
perpetual allegiance, and maintain the American principle that British na-
tive-born subjects, after they have been naturalized under our laws, are, to
all intents and purposes, as much American citizens, and entitled to the
same degree of protection, as though they had been born in the United
States."0
Relations became strained as well between the United States and
other European states as immigrants who came to the United States
in the 1840s and 1850s obtained U.S. naturalization and frequently
returned to their native countries for various reasons and for varying
periods of time. This was particularly true of some of the German
states. The arrest and forcible induction into the Hanoverian army in
1859 of one Ernst, who was born in Hanover and obtained naturali-
zation in the United States, produced a ringing affirmation of the
right of expatriation by Attorney General Black.3 1 Urging President
Buchanan, who had sought his opinion, to "interfere promptly and
decisively" on behalf of Ernst, Black declared:
The natural right of every free person, who owes no debts and is not guilty
of any crime, to leave the country of his birth in good faith and for an
honest purpose, the privilege of throwing off his natural allegiance and sub-
stituting another allegiance in its place - the general right, in one word, of
expatriation, is incontestable .... We take it from natural reason and jus-
tice, from writers of known wisdom, and from the practice of civilized na-
tions. All these are opposed to the doctrine of perpetual allegiance. It is too
injurious to the general interests of mankind to be tolerated; justice denies
that men should either be confined to their native soil or drive away from it
against their will.
3 2
30. III J. MOORE, supra note 16 at § 435, at 566 ("Mr. Buchanan, Sec. of State,
to Mr. Bancroft, min. to England, Oct. 28, 1848, 47 Brit. & For. State Pap. 1236,
1237").
31. 9 Op. Att'y. Gen. 356 (1859).
32. Id. at 357-58.
Ernst was released from military service after the Secretary of State, as instructed by
the President, lodged a stiff protest with the Hanoverian authorities. The latter, however,
made no concession on the principle of perpetual allegiance.
Black's opinion is notable too for his insistence that there could be no distinction be-
tween the rights of native-born and naturalized citizens. Forecasting the position the Su-
preme Court took a century later in Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964) (holding
unconstitutional section 352 of the INA which provided for expatriation of naturalized
citizens who resided abroad in excess of the statutorily prescribed period of time), Black
wrote:
In regard to the protection of our citizens in their rights at home and abroad
we have no law which divides them into classes, or makes any difference
B. Expatriation: A Natural and Inherent Right
By outbreak of the Civil War it was widely accepted in the United
States that the doctrine of perpetual allegiance was not only an
anachronism but also inimical to the interests of the United States.
Wartime exigencies, however, constrained the United States from
vigorously contesting the right of the states of origin of naturalized
United States citizens to levy claims on their persons or property.
When the war ended, Congress put citizenship and expatriation in a
prominent place on its legislative agenda. Bills were introduced to
proscribe loss of citizenship for performance of specified acts and to
provide a means whereby one might voluntarily relinquish citizen-
ship. (None passed.) In June 1866 Congress proposed and sent to the
States the 14th Amendment to the Constitution.
Meanwhile, earlier in 1866, the United States and Britain again
confronted each other over the right of expatriation. A number of
naturalized American citizens who had been born British subjects
were arrested by the British authorities in Ireland and placed on
trial for implication in the Feinian movement. The United States re-
acted sharply. Secretary of State Seward warned the British that the
controversy could find a friendly resolution only by concession, in the
form of a treaty, or of mutual legislation, or some form of arbitra-
tion.33 Other such naturalized American citizens were arrested by
the British authorities in 1867. British refusal to treat these persons
as United States citizens "produced an excitement that, as Mr.
Seward stated, extended 'throughout the whole country, from Port-
land to San Francisco and from St. Paul to Pensacola.' The topic
was discussed in Congress, and exhaustive reports were made both in
the Senate and the House of Representatives on the subject of
expatriation. '- 4
The upshot of this "excitement" was the passage of the Act of
July 27, 1868, entitled "An Act Concerning the Rights of American
Citizens in Foreign States." 35 The Act declared:
Whereas the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all peo-
ple, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness; and whereas, in the recognition of this principle this
government has freely received emigrants from all nations, and invested
them with the rights of citizenship; and whereas it is claimed that such
American citizens, with their descendants, are subjects of foreign states,
whatever between them. A native and a naturalized American may, therefore,
go forth with equal security over every sea and through every land under
heaven, including the country in which the latter was born.
9 Op. Att'y Gen. at 360.
33. III J. MOORE, supra note 16 at § 439, at 579-80.
34. Id. at 580.
35. Title XXV, Citizenship, 18 Rev. St. §§ 1999-2001 (1874). Sec. 1999 has been
incorporated in 8 U.S.C. 1481 (1988).
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owing allegiance to the governments thereof; and whereas it is necessary to
the maintenance of public peace that this claim of foreign allegiance should
be promptly and finally disavowed: Therefore any declaration, instruction,
opinion, order, or decision of any officer of the United States which denies,
restricts, impairs, or questions the right of expatriation, is declared inconsis-
tent with the principles of the Republic.-"
Congress gave this statement of principles teeth by providing that
naturalized citizens should, while abroad, be "entitled to, and shall
receive from the Government the same protection of persons and
property which is accorded to native-born citizens."3 The Act also
charged the President to intervene with any foreign government on
behalf of any citizen of the United States who appeared to have been
wrongfully imprisoned.38 The following day, the 14th Amendment to
the Constitution was ratified.
The principles enunciated in the Act of July 27, 1868 remain a
charter for all American citizens who freely decide to divest them-
selves of that citizenship: no officer of the government may gainsay a
citizen the right to expatriate himself.
C. The Bancroft Treaties
While Congress was debating the bill that became the Act of July
27, 1868, the Department of State was negotiating treaties with a
number of European states in an effort to eliminate irritants in rela-
tions with those states arising from the American naturalization of
their citizens. Many European states, Prussia prominent among
them, required all their male citizens to perform military service.
Even naturalization in a foreign state would not excuse the nationals
of those states from being seized and forced to perform military ser-
vice if they returned to their country of origin. The heavy migration
to the United States in mid-century of nationals of the German
states therefore caused difficulties before the Civil War and after-
ward when many naturalized American citizens, including veterans,
returned to their land of origin. The American Minister in Berlin,
historian and diplomat George Bancroft, was charged with the task
of negotiating an agreement with the North German Confederation,
under the leadership of Prussia, to ameliorate the problem.
In carrying out his assignment, Bancroft was singularly successful,
for the United States negotiated from a position of strength. A "new
and mightier" United States had emerged from the Civil War. Writ-
36. Title XXV, Citizenship, 18 Rev. S.L. § 1999, at 350-51.
37. Id. § 2000 at 351.
38. Id.
ing to President Johnson in 1867, Bancroft said this of the European
perception of post-civil war America: "Public consideration of the
United States stands very high in Europe and is increasing. . . . The
indirect influence of our vitality is exceedingly great."39 Among Eu-
ropean statesmen, Bismark in particular was anxious to maintain
good relations with the United States.
The first and bellwether of the series of treaties known as the Ban-
croft treaties was concluded by Bancroft with the North German
Confederation on February 22, 1868.40 Typically, these treaties pro-
vided that each of the signatories would acknowledge as a citizen of
the other such of its citizens who became naturalized by the other.
The treaties thus removed a serious irritant from the relations of the
United States with the states with which they were concluded. But
the treaties did more than that, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed
out nearly one hundred years later: "This series of treaties initiated
this country's policy of automatic divestment of citizenship for speci-
fied conduct affecting our foreign relations. '41 The Bancroft Treaties
virtually prescribed loss of citizenship. For example, if a German,
who was naturalized in the United States, were to renew residency in
North Germany for a certain period of time without the intent to
return to the United States, she would be held to have renounced her
naturalization in the United States. The same consequences would
result if an American became naturalized in North Germany and
renewed residence in the United States. 2
It was not long thereafter that 'the United States and Great Brit-
ain closed the book on their long-standing confrontation over the
right of expatriation. In 1870, by Act of Parliament, Great Britain
finally abandoned the "hoary shibboleth", "once an Englishman, al-
ways an Englishman," and declared that any British subject who be-
came naturalized in another country would become an alien under
British law.43 Later that year, the United States and Great Britain
concluded a convention on naturalization. 44 In distinction to the Ban-
croft Treaties, the Anglo-American convention of 1870 merely pro-
vided that citizens of the United States who were naturalized as
British subjects would be recognized as such by the United States;
and British subjects who obtained naturalization in the United
39. THE LiFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE BANCROFT 202 (M. Howe ed. 1908).
40. 15 Stat. 615 (1868).
Bancroft personally negotiated similar conventions with Baden, Bavaria, Hesse, and
Wuerttemberg. Other American diplomats concluded analogous treaties with other Euro-
pean states as well as certain Caribbean nations.
41. Speaking for the Court in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 48 (1958).
42. Article IV of the Treaty between the United States and the North German
Confederation. 15 Stat. 615 (1868).
43. 33 & 34 Vict. 105, c.14.
44. 16 Stat. 725 (1870).
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States would be so recognized by Britain.
D. The Department of State Steps Into A Legislative Vacuum
The Act of July 27, 1868 ended the "conflict in precept" over
whether the doctrine of perpetual allegiance applied in the United
States but it did not prescribe what acts would constitute expatria-
tion. Since American citizens, natural-born or naturalized, went
abroad in growing numbers after the Civil War, the Executive con-
sidered it imperative that Congress enact expatriation legislation. In
1874 President Grant explained to a Congress that was little dis-
posed to act why a comprehensive statute was needed.
Notwithstanding such assertion [in the Act of July 27, 1868 that expatria-
tion is a natural and inherent right] and the necessity of frequent applica-
tion of the principle, no legislation has been had defining what acts or for-
malities shall work expatriation or when a citizen shall be deemed to have
renounced or to have lost his citizenship. The importance of such definition
is obvious. The representatives of the United States in foreign countries are
continually called upon to lend their aid and the protection of the United
States to persons concerning the good faith or the reality of whose citizen-
ship there is at least great question. In some cases the provisions of the
treaties furnish some guide; in others it seems left to the person claiming
the benefits of citizenship, while living in a foreign country, contributing in
no manner to the performance of the duties of a citizen of the United
States, and without intention at any time to return and undertake those
duties, to use the claims to citizenship of the United States simply as a
shield from the performance of the obligations of a citizen elsewhere.45
Since Congress would not act, the Department of State was
"forced to look elsewhere for an enumeration of the acts" that would
work expatriation, wrote Secretary of State Hamilton Fish in 1873.46
Observing that Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Supreme
Court, had said that the situation of an American citizen "is com-
pletely changed, where, by this own act, he has made himself the
subject of a foreign power (2 Cranch. 119)," 47 Fish stated that Mar-
shall's opinion was recognized as furnishing, as far as it went, a rule
of action for the Department of State, but, he added, there were
other cases
• . .in which the voluntary expatriation is to be inferred, not from an open
act of renunciation, but from other circumstances, as, for instance, a resi-
dence in a foreign land so constant, and under such circumstances, that a
purpose of a change of allegiance may be reasonably assumed. Each case as
45. Annual Message, Dec. 7, 1874. IX MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
4245-46 (J. Richardson ed. 1897).
46. III J. MOORE, supra note 16 at § 466, at 712 ("Mr. Fish, See. of State, to Mr.
Washburne, min. to France, June 28, 1873, For. Rel. 1873, I. 256, 258").
47. Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch. 64, 120 (1804).
it arises must be decided on its merits.48
Two months later, Attorney General Williams, responding to
questions put to him (and to all other members of the Cabinet) by
President Grant, delivered a comprehensive opinion on expatriation
and citizenship.49 Williams cited the following as expatriating acts:
Residence in a foreign country and an intent not to return, are essential
elements of expatriation; but to show complete expatriation as the law now
stands, it is necessary to show something more than these. Attorney-Gen-
eral Black says, (9 Opin., 359,) that expatriation includes not only emigra-
tion out of one's native country, but naturalization in the country adopted
as a future residence.
My opinion, however, is that, in addition to domicile and intent to re-
main, such expressions or acts as amount to a renunciation of United States
citizenship and a willingness to submit to or adopt the obligations of the
country in which the person resides, such as accepting public employment,
engaging in military services, & c., may be treated by this Government as
expatriation, without actual naturalization. Naturalization is without doubt
the highest, but not the only, evidence of expatriation."
Williams' opinion is also notable for his ruling that the Act of July
27, 1868 should be construed as including native-born as well as nat-
uralized citizens, and that "the Executive should give it that compre-
hensive effect." 5' The Attorney General concluded by observing that
in the absence of legislation on expatriation, "the rules of law relat-
ing thereto are to be drawn from writers upon international and pub-
lic law, who do not always agree, and therefore it will be difficult for
the Government to act upon any such rules without chance of
controversy. 5
2
The Act of July 27, 1868 and Attorney General Williams' opinion
provided a legal basis for the Department of State to act, and act it
did in the last third of the 19th century. The Department made rul-
ings, often drafted by the Secretary of State personally, on forfeiture
of citizenship. Usually, these rulings were made in response to the
requests of diplomatic and consular officers for the Secretary's opin-
ion whether a United States citizen had expatriated himself by per-
forming an act ostensibly in derogation of citizenship. Of these rul-
ings it has been said: "Strictly speaking, it is beyond the competence
of the executive, without legislative authorization, to declare a citi-
zen to be expatriated, although the extension or withdrawal of diplo-
matic protection is within executive discretion. 15 3 But no one chal-
lenged the authority of the Department to make determinations of
loss of citizenship because, it is fair to assume, such a role was gen-
48. III J. MOORE, supra note 16, at § 466, at 712.
49. 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 295 (1873).
50. Id. at 296.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 300.
53. I. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD, § 324 p.
689 (1915).
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erally perceived to be a reasonable exercise of the Department's for-
eign affairs responsibilities.
A sampling of rulings made by Secretaries of State in the last
third of the 19th century and the early years of the 20th will illus-
trate the varied circumstances under which expatriation was deemed
to have occurred-or not to have occurred. Throughout that period,
the rulings show fair consistency with respect to matters of substance
from one administration to another.
The following opinion issued by Secretary of State John Hay in
1898 expresses a position on obtaining naturalization in a foreign
state that was typical of rulings on what Attorney General Williams
called "the highest evidence of expatriation. '54 The occasion was the
request of the United States Minister at Monrovia for guidance as to
how he should treat "certain citizens who, having emigrated to Libe-
ria and acquired the rights of citizenship in that Republic, still claim
that they are citizens of the United States." Hay began by noting
that
the Liberian Government does not require colored persons going from the
United States to that Republic to renounce their allegiance to the Govern-
ment of the United States or to take out naturalization papers, as is re-
quired in the case of immigrants from other countries, but that the fact of
such a colored citizen of the United States taking out an allotment of land
enables him to be regarded for all national purposes as a Liberian citizen. 55
He then observed that "analogous questions" had arisen previously
regarding the status of American citizens residing in Hawaii, St.
Thomas and other places, where an alien taking up residence was
admitted to citizenship without forswearing allegiance to the United
States. "In the case of Hawaii," Hay noted,
[T]he formal act of admission to citizenship and the oath taken by the ap-
plicant purported to preserve the original allegiance for all effects not con-
nected with domicile in Hawaii.
Mr. Secretary Gresham, and after him Secretaries Olney and Sherman,
held that an American so naturalized in Hawaii effectively lost his United
States citizenship. 56
With reference to the Minister's inquiry, Hay stated:
In the case of an American in Liberia, which you report, the omission of an
oath of allegiance or requirement of formal naturalization, constituting a
peculiar exception in favor of American citizens, would at first sight appear
to modify the principle involved in the Hawaiian decision. In fact, however,
the principle involved is substantially the same. The Republic of Liberia is
54. III J. MOORE, supra note 16 at § 468, at 729-30 ("Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to
Mr. Smith, min. to Liberia, No. 20, November 6, 1898, MS. Inst. Liberia, II 346").
55. Id.
56. Id.
an independent sovereignty, in no wise bound to or dependent upon the
United States, and, theoretically at least, it is within the range of possibili-
ties that differences might arise between the two governments leading even
to rupture of relations. It is inconsistent for an individual to bear true alle-
giance at the same time to two different sovereigns, and the exercise of the
rights of citizenship under any alien sovereignty must be regarded as a vol-
untary assumption of the obligations of allegiance to such sovereignty.
As a doctrine, therefore, it may be said that when a citizen of the United
States acquires, by whatever process, the status of a Liberian citizen he
performs an act incompatible with his allegiance to the United States and
with his citizenship thereof.57
The Department uniformly held that residence of a naturalized
United States citizen in a foreign country alone was not sufficient
evidence of expatriation, although protracted residence abroad raised
a presumption of abandonment of citizenship. In an opinion rendered
for President Grant in 1873, Secretary of State Fish expressed the
view that a naturalized citizen who resided abroad for any legitimate
purpose would not lose his citizenship "if he does so sincerely and
bona fide animo revertendi, and does nothing inconsistent with his
pre-existing allegiance ... .- 5' Fish asserted, however, that if a nat-
uralized citizen moved abroad and settled there, "and avows his pur-
pose not to return, he has placed himself in the position where his
country has the right to presume that he has made his election of
expatriation. ' 59
Making an oath of allegiance to a foreign sovereign or state that
contained no renunciation of United States citizenship and did not
have the effect of naturalizing the citizen in a foreign state was held
not to constitute an expatriative act.60 However, a citizen who made
an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution and Laws of the
Hawaiian Islands and bear true allegiance to its King, but did not
expressly renounce allegiance to the United States, was held to man-
ifest an intention of abandoning American citizenship. "The oath is
inconsistent with his allegiance to the United States."6 1
With respect to the effect on the citizenship of an American wo-
man who married an alien, the Department maintained a consistent
position, as Secretary of State Blaine explained to the American
57. Id.
58. F. VAN DYNE, CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES 273 ("Secretary Fish to
the President, For. Rel. 1873, pt. 2, pp. 1188, 1189."
59. Id. at 273-74.
60. III J. MOORE, supra note 16, § 468, at 722 ("Mr. Fish, See. of State, to Mr.
Whiting (a minister who made the oath simply in order to qualify as pastor of a church
in Canada) March 6, 1873, 98 MS Dom. Let. 74").
Similarly, making a simple oath to the British Queen in order to qualify as a public
school teacher in Canada was held not to interfere with the citizen's citizenship. Id.("Mr. John Davis, Act. Sec. of State to Mr. Barnett, consul at Paramaribo, August 20,
1884, 111 MS. Inst. Consuls. 413").
61. Id. at 727 ("Mr. Gresham, Sec. of State, to Mr. Willis, Min. to Hawaii, April
5, 1895, For. Rel. 1895, II, 853").
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Minister to Germany in 1890:
The view has been taken by this Department in several cases that the mar-
riage of an American woman to a foreigner does not completely divest her
of her original nationality. Her citizenship is held for most purposes to be in
abeyance during coverture, but to be susceptible of revival by her return to
the jurisdiction and allegiance of the United States.6 2
Generally, accepting public office under a foreign government was
held not to constitute expatriation.
As to the mere tenure of office under the Samoan government, the Depart-
ment is of opinion that such tenure of office, unless it required the assump-
tion of Samoan citizenship, could not of itself be treated as an act of expa-
triation, as there is nothing in the Constitution or laws of the United States
that precludes a private citizen of the United States from rendering official
services to foreign governments.13
Responding to the request of the United States Minister to Mex-
ico for guidance as to whether an American citizen who had served
in the Mexican army was entitled to diplomatic protection, Secretary
of State Bayard said in 1888: "[A]s a general rule it may be main-
tained that the mere fact of entering into a foreign military service
does not divest. . .nationality. ' '64
E. Congress Finally Accepts the Need for Expatriation
Legislation
Prior to 1907, bills had been introduced in Congress on several
occasions, notably in 1794, 1797, 1818 and 1868, to enact laws
which would describe certain acts as expatriative. On each occasion
Congress considered but rejected even bills that were concerned with
recognizing the right of voluntary expatriations and with providing
62. Id. § 408, at 454 ("Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Phelps, Min. to Germany,
Feb. 1, 1890, For. Rel. 1890, 301"). See, to the same effect, id. ("Mr. Evarts, Sec. of
State, to Mrs. Wood. Sept. 24, 1880, 134 Ms. Dom. Let. 455").
63. Id. § 468, at 718 ("Mr. Rives, Assist. Sec. of State, to Mr. Sewall, Consul-
General at Apia, No. 28, Jan. 6, 1888, 123 MS Inst. Consuls, 532").
64. Id. § 469, at 734 ("Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Whitehouse, Charge at
Mexico, No. 166, Nov. 14, 1888, MS. Inst. Mexico, XXII, 300").
See, to the same effect, Secretary of State Hay, who stated in 1899 in the case of an
American citizen businessman in Nicaragua who accepted a commission in the Nicara-
guan army to aid in the suppression of a rebellion that:[T]here is no statutory provision determining the circumstances under which a
citizen of the United States may forfeit his nationality. Should the circum-
stances of a citizen's accepting military or civil office under a foreign govern-
ment make him, under the law of the foreign country, a citizen thereof, the act
would be deemed a voluntary abandonment of his American status and an as-
sumption of another allegiance.
Id. § 469, at 735 ("Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Turley, April 6, 1899, 236 MS. Dom.
Let. 186").
the means to exercise that right.65 Bills were defeated in 1797 be-
cause "many members of Congress still adhered to the English doc-
trine of perpetual allegiance and doubted whether a citizen could
even voluntarily renounce his citizenship."6"
The bill introduced in 1818, by which time "almost no one
doubted the existence of the right of voluntary expatriation," pro-
posed a method by which one might voluntarily relinquish citizen-
ship.6' 7 It too was defeated, however, its opponents arguing that Con-
gress had no express or implied authority to provide that a certain
act would constitute expatriation."8
Several of the expatriation bills introduced in 1868 imposed expa-
triation for commission of certain acts. "With little discussion, these
proposals were defeated. '69 The debate on another bill, which pro-
vided merely a means by which a citizen might voluntarily renounce
citizenship is of particular interest, for "even [this] proposal, which
went no further than to provide a means of evidencing a citizen's
intent to renounce his citizenship, was defeated. '7 Thus Congress
did not provide a means of expatriation because, as the Chairman of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs put it, expatriation was a
subject which "ought not to be legislated upon. . . .[T]his comes
within the scope and character of natural rights which no Govern-
ment has the right to control and which no Government can confer.
And wherever this subject is alluded to in the Constitution . . . it is
in the declaration that Congress shall have no power whatever to
legislate upon these matters."'"
The Act which was passed after the debate on expatriation, the
Act of July 27, 1868, simply recognized that expatriation was a nat-
ural and inherent right of all people.72
Nearly forty years passed before Congress again considered expa-
triation legislation. Shortly after the turn of the century, Congress
65. See Afoyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967). The Court cited these earlier
failed attempts to legislate on expatriation in support of its conclusion that Congress has
no power to prescribe loss of citizenship, absent the consent of the citizen. As the Court
put it,
even before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, views were expressed
in Congress and by this Court that under the Constitution the Government has
granted no power, even under its express power to pass a uniform rule of natu-
ralization, to determine what conduct should and should not result in the loss
of citizenship.
Id.
66. 387 U.S. at 258 (citing 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 1005, 1027-30 (1794); 7 ANNALS
OF CONG. 349 et seq. (1797)).
67. 387 U.S. at 258.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 265 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2317 (1868)).
71. Id. at n.20 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2316 (1868)).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 30 and 31.
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decided that the time had come to prescribe what acts would consti-
tute expatriation, as Presidents from Grant through Roosevelt had
urged it. to do. In his annual message to Congress in 1904, President
Roosevelt put it to Congress that United States laws relating to citi-
zenship "ought also to be made the subject of scientific inquiry with
a view to probable further legislation. By what acts expatriation may
be assumed to have been accomplished," he stated, was a question
"of serious import, involving personal rights and often producing
friction between this Government and foreign governments. Yet
upon [this question] our laws are silent. 1 73
As the United States entered the 20th century, there was general
recognition that the times had changed; a genuine need for expatria-
tion legislation had arisen. Surveying earlier efforts to enact legisla-
tion on expatriation, the Citizenship Board established by Secretary
of State Root in 1906 to inquire into the laws and practice regarding
citizenship, expatriation, and protection of citizens abroad, offered
this explanation of the need for Congress to act:
[T]he class of Americans who separate themselves from the United States
and live within the jurisdiction of foreign countries is becoming larger each
year, and the question of their protection causes increasing embarrassment
to this Government in its relations with foreign powers.
Immigration to the United States has of recent years reached proportions
hitherto unheard of, and many of these immigrants will become naturalized
citizens of the United States. Naturalized citizens are more apt to go
abroad than native citizens. Having already changed their domicile, they
are more apt to change it again. . . . One reason why the attempts which
have been made in the past to secure a legislative definition of expatriation
have failed is undoubtedly because the necessity has been slight in compari-
son with the necessity which now exists.7 4
In April 1906, the Senate passed and sent to the House a joint
resolution which provided that a commission should be established
"to examine into the subjects of citizenship, expatriation and protec-
tion abroad," and make a report to be referred to Congress for its
consideration.75 In reporting out the joint resolution, the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs asserted: "Legislation is required to
settle some of the embarrassing questions that arise in reference to
citizenship, expatriation, and the protection of American citizens
73. Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 6, 1904. IX MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS, supra note 44 at 6917.
74. "Report on the Subject of Citizenship, Expatriation and Protection Abroad,"
Prepared by the Board appointed by Secretary of State Root in July 1906 to study those
matters. H.R. Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1906).
75. Id., referring to S. Res. 30, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (1906).
abroad.'76 Acknowledging the leading role of the Department of
State in such matters, the House committee stated: "We should be
glad if the Secretary of State would select some gentlemen con-
nected with the State Department who have given special attention
to these subjects, have them prepare a report and propose legislation
that could be considered by Congress at the next session."177
The Secretary of State on December 18, 1906 submitted to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives the report of the Citizen-
ship Board. The report, which Secretary Root described in his trans-
mittal letter as "a very clear and thorough exposition of this most
important subject," contained recommendations which by and large
reflected the tests and criteria the Department of State had applied
over the years to determine whether expatriation had taken place.
Congress began consideration of the recommendations of the Board
early in 1907, and after brief debate passed a bill which became the
Act of March 2, 1907.8 Members did not express any views that
expatriation was not a proper subject on which Congress might legis-
late. However, during the very brief debate in the House of Repre-
sentatives (there was virtually no floor debate in the Senate), some
members expressed concern about the bill's provision that natural-
ized citizens who resided abroad would be presumed to intend to ex-
patriate themselves. That provision, it was observed, was in conflict
with the Constitution which makes no difference between native-
born and naturalized citizens.79
F. The Act of March 2, 1907
The expatriative provisions of the Act of March 2, 1907 generally
incorporated the Board's recommendations and were embodied in
sections 2 and 3. They read as follows:
Sec. 2 That any American citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated him-
self when he has been naturalized in any foreign state in conformity with its
laws, or when he has taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign State.
When any naturalized citizen shall have resided for two years in the for-
eign state from which he came, or for five years in any other foreign state,
it shall be presumed that he has ceased to be an American citizen, and the
place of his general abode shall be deemed his place of residence during
said years: Provided, however, That such presumption may be overcome on
the presentation of satisfactory evidence to a diplomatic or consular officer
of the United States, under such rules and regulations as the Department of
State may prescribe: And provided also, That no American citizen shall be
76. HousE COMM. on Foreign Aff., H.R. REP. No. 4784, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1906).
77. Id.
78. 34 Stat. 1228 (1907) (repealed by Nationality Act of Oct. 14, 1940, 8 U.S.C §
17). 79. 41 CoNGo. Rsc. 1464-67 (1907).
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allowed to expatriate himself when this country is at war.80
Sec. 3. That any American woman who marries a foreigner shall take the
nationality of her husband. At the termination of the marital relations she
may resume her American citizenship, if abroad, by registering as an
American citizen within one year with a consul of the United States, or by
returning to reside in the United States, or, if residing in the United States
at the termination of the marital relation, by continuing to reside therein.,,
The Act of March 2, 1907, which provided "the necessary legisla-
tive definition" of the means of expatriation, "put an end to the long
circuit of doubt and uncertainty over the question of expatriation." '82
No longer would the Department of State act or be required to act
beyond its legal competence in making determinations of loss of
nationality.
G. The Catalog of Expatriative Acts Grows Longer
As the United States became more deeply involved in the world
after 1907, American citizens, native-born and naturalized, went
abroad in increasing numbers to live, work, and study. In both the
executive and legislative branches there was sentiment that certain
acts in addition to those prescribed in the Act of March 2, 1907
should be included so as to ensure that the conduct of American
citizens would not lead to disputes and embarrassment in the con-
duct of foreign relations. This concern was manifested in the Nation-
ality Act of 1940.13 The list of expatriative acts in the Act of March
2, 1907 was lengthened considerably. In the new Act, in addition to
80. The State Department board recommended that the provisions of the second
paragraph of section 2 should apply to all United States citizens, although it recognized
that naturalized citizens were more likely to go abroad and remain abroad than natural
born citizens.
The American Minister to Germany sent the following report to the Secretary of State
in 1900. It is a fairly typical observation by diplomatic officers of the time about the
attitude of naturalized citizens who settled abroad.
Hardly a day passes that there do not come to this embassy persons who have
made the briefest possible stay in the United States and demand passports
clearly for the purpose of passing their lives here free from all obligations ei-
ther to the country of their birth or of their adoption. Many of these have not
the slightest appreciation of their real rights or duties as Americans, have no
feelings in common with those of American citizens, and some are not even
able to write or speak the English language.
III J. MOORE, supra note 16 at § 393, at 402-03 ("Mr. White, American amb. to Ger-
many, to Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, April 21, 1900, For. Rel. 1900, 25-26").
81. Section 3 was repealed by the Act of Sept. 22, 1922, ch. 411, 42 Stat. 1021
(note inserted by author).
82. T. TSIANG, EXPECTATIONS, supra note 21, at 109.
83. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, tit. I, § 1, 54 Stat. 1137 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 907, repealed by ch. 477, title IV, § 403(a)(42, 66 Stat. 280, eft. Dec. 24, 1952).
naturalization in a foreign state, provision was made for loss of citi-
zenship for taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign state; entering
the armed forces of a foreign state; holding public office in a foreign
state; voting in a foreign political election; formally renouncing citi-
zenship; deserting the United States armed forces in wartime; com-
mitting treason; and formally renouncing citizenship in the United
States in wartime."' The provisions of the act of March 2, 1907 re-
garding loss of citizenship by naturalized citizens were tightened.8,
The rebuttable presumption of the earlier Act was not incorporated
in the Nationality Act of 1940. The rationale for the stringent provi-
sions regarding naturalized citizens given by the Cabinet Committee
appointed to review the Nationality laws when it made its report to
President Roosevelt in 1938 was that:
• . .The admission of an alien to the privilege of American citizenship is
subject to the condition that he intends to reside permanently in the United
States and perform the duties of citizenship. When a naturalized citizen
abandons his residence in the United States and takes up residence in the
state of which he was formerly a national, definite termination of his Amer-
ican citizenship should follow.86
How does one account for the lengthening of the list of acts that
would work expatriation? First, as President Roosevelt noted in his
message to the Congress in 1938 transmitting the report of the Cabi-
net Committee, it was considered desirable "from [an] administra-
tive standpoint [to] hav[e] the existing nationality laws now scat-
tered among a large number of separate statutes embodied in a
single, logically arranged and understandable code. '"8 7 The greatly
expanded list of expatriative acts might also be explained, it has
been pointed out, by the fact that the Nationality Act of 1940 was
drafted in a time of economic stress and increasing security con-
sciousness as a result of the beginning of World War II, and that it
reflected the post-World War I attitude in America that stricter re-
quirements should be imposed for acquisition and retention of'
United States citizenship. 8
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, a product of the
post-war climate, the Cold War and hyper-security consciousness,89
incorporated most of the expatriative provisions of the Nationality
Act of 1940.90
84. Id. at §§ 401(a)-(h), 54 Stat. 1168-69.
85. Id. at 1170, § 404.
86. CABINET CoMMITTEE, 76TH CONG. 1ST SEss., A REPORT PROPOSING A REvi-
SION OF THE NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 69 (House Comm. Print 1939).
87. Id. at iii.
88. Duvall, Expatriation under United States Law, Perez to Afroyim: Tile Search
for a Philosophy of American Citizenship, 56 VA. L. REv., 408, 416 (1970).
89. Id.
90. INA § 349(a), 66 Stat. 163, 267-68 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)
and amended by the Expatriation Act of 1954, ch. 1256, 68 Stat. 1146).
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H. Constitutional Rulings Shorten the List of
Expatriative Acts
An important challenge to the Nationality Act of 1940, the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 1952, and the general power of Con-
gress to prescribe what acts constitute expatriation was mounted in
Perez v. Brownell, but rejected by the Supreme Court." In holding
that Congress might prescribe loss of citizenship for voting in a for-
eign election, the Court declared that withdrawal of citizenship was
reasonably calculated to effect an end that is within the power of
Congress to achieve-avoidance of embarrassment in the conduct of
the foreign relations of the United States.2 As Justice Frankfurter,
who delivered the opinion of a divided (5 to 4) Court, bluntly put it:
"The termination of citizenship terminates the problem." 93
In decisions rendered between 1958 and 1967, the Court dramati-
cally shortened the list of expatriative acts by declaring constitution-
ally infirm statutory expatriative provisions relating to: desertion
from the armed forces;94 departing or remaining outside the United
States to avoid military service;95 foreign residence by naturalized
citizens; 6 and voting in a foreign political election. 7 Nonetheless,
the list of acts which may result in loss of United States citizenship
remains a long one relative to the laws of other democratic nations,
91. 356 U.S. 44 (1958), overruled, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
92. Id. at 60-62.
93. Id. at 60.
94. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
95. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
96. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
The Court repudiated long held positions of the executive and legislative branches re-
garding loss of citizenship by naturalized citizens. In language reminiscent of the opinion
of Attorney General Black in 1859 championing the rights of naturalized citizens (see
supra note 31), the Court disposed once and for all of the proposition that naturalized
citizens should be set apart from native-born citizens.
This statute proceeds on the impermissible assumption that naturalized citizens
as a class are less reliable and bear less allegiance to this country than do the
native born. This is an assumption that is impossible for us to make. Moreover,
while the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid
discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.' Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499. A native-born citizen is free to reside abroad
indefinitely without suffering loss of citizenship. The discrimination aimed at
naturalized citizens drastically limits their rights to live and work abroad in a
way that other citizens may. It creates indeed a second-class citizenship. Living
abroad, whether the citizen be naturalized or native born, is no badge of lack
of allegiance and in no way evidences a voluntary renunciation of nationality
and allegiance.
Schneider, 377 U.S. at 168-69.
97. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). See infra text accompanying note 124.
particularly states with values we share, such as the United King-
dom and Canada, whose laws provide essentially one principal
ground for loss of nationality-formal renunciation of citizenship.98
III. CONSISTENT ELEMENTS OF A DETERMINATION OF
EXPATRIATION
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended in
1986, prescribes that citizenship shall not be lost unless it is proved
that an American citizen voluntarily performed a valid statutory ex-
patriative act with the intention of relinquishing citizenship. 9 In loss
of nationality proceedings, the government bears the burden to prove
all of the foregoing three elements. With respect to the issue of
whether the act was performed voluntarily, however, the government
benefits from a rebuttable presumption that one who performs an
expatriative act does so voluntarily. 1°°
98. The British Nationality Act of 1981, ch. 61, provides that British nationality
shall be lost by formal renunciation or as a consequence of fraudulent naturalization. A
class of British citizens, but a very limited one, may lose nationality by obtaining another
citizenship.
The Canadian Citizenship Act prescribes that loss of Canadian citizenship shall result
only from formal renunciation or obtaining naturalization fraudulently. Citizenship Act,
CAN. REv. STAT. ch. C-29 (1985).
99. INA § 349(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1988) (as amended by Immigration &
Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653, 100 Stat. 3655, 3658) pro-
vides that:
A person who is a national of the United States whether by birth or naturaliza-
tion, shall lose his nationality by voluntarily performing any of the following
acts with the intention of relinquishing United States nationality
The acts, stated summarily, are:
(I) obtaining naturalization in a foreign state;
(2) swearing an oath of allegiance to a foreign state;
(3) serving in the armed forces of a foreign state;
(4) serving in the government of a foreign state;
(5) making a formal renunciation of United States nationality;
(6) making a formal renunciation of United States nationality in the United
States in wartime with the approval of the Attorney General; and
(7) committing treason against the United States.
The Supreme Court has consistently anl expressly held that only voluntary acts work
expatriation. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S.
253 (1967); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 22 (1958); Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129(1958); Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
The Amendments of 1986 brought the INA into line with rulings of the Supreme
Court in Afroyim and Terrazas that loss of citizenship depends on whether the citizen
intended to relinquish citizenship. See infra part III.
100. INA § 349(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(b) provides that:
(b) Whenever the loss of United States nationality is put in issue in any
action or proceeding commenced on or after September 26, 1961 under, or by
virtue of, the provisions of this chapter or any other act, the burden shall be
upon the person or party claiming that such loss occurred, to establish such
claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Any person who commits or per-
forms, or who has committed or performed, any act of expatriation under the
provisions of this chapter or any other Act shall be presumed to have done so
voluntarily, but such presumption may be rebutted upon a showing, by a pre-
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A. Voluntariness-The Immemorial Prerequisite to Expatriation
When Henry James expatriated himself in 1915, the Department
of State bore no burden under either the Act of March 2, 1907 or
case law to establish that a person who performed an expatriative
act had done so voluntarily. Nonetheless, it had long been accepted
that only uncoerced acts would work expatriation. The notion that
expatriation can only result from voluntary action is inherent in the
Act of July 27, 1868, "An Act Concerning the Rights of American
Citizens in Foreign States." 10 1 Attorney General Williams made it
clear in the opinion he prepared for President Grant in 1873 that
expatriation depends on a free will act.10 "[I]f [a] citizen emigrates
to a foreign country," he wrote,
and there, in the mode provided by its laws, or in any other solemn and
public manner, renounces his United States citizenship, and makes a volun-
tary submission to its authorities with a bona fide intent of becoming a
citizen or subject there, I think that the Government of the United States
should not regard this procedure otherwise than as an act of expatriation.1 0'
After 1868, in ruling on whether a citizen expatriated himself by
performing in a foreign state an act inconsistent with United States
citizenship, Secretaries of State left no doubt that only voluntary
acts would result in the loss of citizenship. Thus Secretary of State
Bayard stated in 1888:
This Government maintains that naturalization is a voluntary act, not to be
imputed or determined by construction, but to be affirmatively performed
by the individual. While it does not deny that a citizen may voluntarily
divest himself of his allegiance and acquire a new one, and while it also
recognizes that there are certain specific acts which he may perform in a
foreign state, and which in themselves are tantamount to a voluntary and
open renunciation of his former nationality or allegiance, yet manifestly the
allegation of the Mexican Government in Mr. Sherwell's case is not of this
nature.'0
While acknowledging that only voluntary acts could work expatri-
ation, the Department held that any citizen who alleged that he ac-
ted under duress when he performed an expatriative act should bear
the burden of proof, for it was presumed that if he acted wittingly,
he acted voluntarily. In taking this position, the Department simply
ponderance of the evidence, that the act or acts committed or performed were
not done voluntarily.
101. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
102. 14 Op. Att'y Gen. 295 (1873). See supra note 48.
103. Id. at 296.
104. III J. MOORE, supra note 16 at § 469, 733-34 ("Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to
Mr. Whitehouse, charge at Mexico, No. 166, Nov. 14, 1888, Ms. Inst. Mexico, XXII.
300").
followed the common law rule that consciously performed acts are
presumed to be voluntary.105
In the digests of the opinions of the Secretaries of State prior to
1907 it is rare to find reports of cases where the Secretary deter-
mined that the citizen acted involuntarily.106 Why this was so - one
can only speculate. Perhaps those American citizens who went
abroad in the last third of the 19th century and the early years of
the 20th (in contrast to many Americans who went abroad in the
1930s and 1940s) rarely found themselves in circumstances where
they were forced to jeopardize American citizenship by performing
an expatriative act in order to avert a threat to their lives, livelihood,
or freedom. It would not seem unreasonable to assume that if, before
World War I, a citizen voluntarily left the United States, settled in a
foreign state and set up a business there, it was rather unlikely that
he could establish, or would try to establish, that he acted involunta-
rily if, say, he subsequently obtained naturalization in that state.
The Act of March 2, 1907 was silent on whether expatriation de-
pended upon performance of a voluntary expatriative act. The De-
partment of State, however, assumed from the first that such was the
intent of Congress. As Secretary of State Knox declared in 1910 in
an instruction to the United States Minister to Portugal regarding
the case of an American citizen who made an oath of allegiance to
Portugal:
If he was forced by officials in Azores to swear allegiance to Portugal, it
cannot be considered that he has expatriated himself under the provisions of
the first paragraph of Section 2 of the expatriation act of March 2, 1907.107
In December 1915, six months after Henry James expatriated
himself, the Supreme Court addressed the issue whether expatriation
depended upon the voluntary action of the citizen. In Mackenzie v.
Hare, the first case to rule on the power of Congress to enact expa-
triative legislation, the Court upheld the constitutionality of section 3
of the Act of March 2, 1907, which provided that an American wo-
man would lose her nationality upon marrying an alien.108 Address-
105. See Towson v. Moore, 173 U.S. 17 (1899); Savage v. United States, 92 U.S.
382 (1875); and Mason v. United States, 84 U.S. 67 (1872).
Under the provisions of section 349(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(b), a person who
performs a statutory expatriating act is presumed to have acted voluntarily, but the pre-
sumption may be rebutted upon a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
act was not voluntary. See supra note 96.
106. III J. MOORE, supra note 116 at § 431-83; and F. VAN DYNE, CITIzENsHIP OF
THE UNITED STATES (1904).
107. II C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 383 at 1160 n.3 (1945) ("For. Rel. 1910,
p. 832").
108. 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
Mrs. Mackenzie, a native-born American citizen, married a British subject and resided
with him in the United States. Thereafter, the Board of Elections of San Francisco re-
fused to register her as a voter on grounds that she expatriated herself under section 3 of
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ing the issue of voluntariness, the Court declared: "It may be con-
ceded that a change of citizenship cannot be arbitrarily imposed,"
but noted that "[t]he law in controversy does not have that fea-
ture." 109 In the Court's judgment, Mrs. Mackenzie freely elected to
contract marriage with an alien, and thus knowingly brought herself
within the purview of the law. "It [the Act of March 2, 1907] deals
with a condition voluntarily entered into, with notice of the conse-
quences," the Court said.110
After the enactment of the Act of March 2, 1907, some citizens
who performed an expatriative act maintained that they did not do
so freely, but usually they were not able to convince the Department
of State that they should not be expatriated. As one commentator
has written:
Not infrequently during World War I, before the United States became a
belligerent, American citizens took oaths of allegiance to foreign States
under circumstances which, according to the subsequent contentions of the
individuals concerned, savored of duress. Such persons usually experienced
difficulty, however, in convincing the Department of State that their action
had been in fact involuntary."1
The difficulty such persons experienced is prevailing undoubtedly
was due in part to the fact that consular regulations placed a heavy
burden of proof on those who alleged that they performed the act
under duress.11 2
the Act of March 2, 1907 by marrying a foreign national. See supra text accompanying
note 77. She prosecuted a writ of mandamus in state court. After losing below, she ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, contending that section 3 was unconstitutional since it was
beyond the power of Congress to enact.
109. Id. at 311. Section 3 was repealed in 1922. See supra note 77.
110. Id. at 311-12.
See also Ex Parte Griffin, 237 Fed. 445 (N.D.N.Y. 1916). There the court held that
an American citizen who made an oath of allegiance to King George the Fifth upon
enlisting in the Canadian Army acted voluntarily (although he contended he was drunk
at the time), and thus expatriated himself under section 2 of the Act of March 2, 1907.
And see Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 343 (1939), where the Supreme Court again
construed the Act of March 2, 1907. Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Hughes said
that: "We think that the statute was aimed at a voluntary expatriation," and noted that
the classic definition of expatriation is: "The voluntary renunciation or abandonment of
nationality and allegiance." Id. at 334. See Van Dyne, supra note 102, at 269.
111. II C. HYDE, supra note 103 at § 383 p. 1160-61 n.3.
112. Id.
Regulations promulgated in 1930, for example, prescribed that:
Where it is alleged that a foreign oath of allegiance was taken under duress,
the burden of proof should be placed upon the person asserting duress to estab-
lish that fact to the satisfaction of the Department. The mere statement of the
person concerned will not be accepted as proof of the allegation that the oath
was taken under duress. The best evidence of the existence of duress would
ordinarily be some statement made contemporaneously with or immediately
With the rise of fascism in Europe and Japan, World War II, and
in the war's chaotic aftermath, American citizens, frequently dual
nationals who had returned or had been taken by their parents to the
country of their birth, found themselves in perilous situations. In or-
der to protect their and their family's lives or livelihoods, they per-
formed a statutory expatriating act: obtained foreign naturalization;
allowed themselves to be conscripted into the armed forces of the
enemy; or accepted employment in a foreign government. Many
later instituted actions in federal court under the provisions of the
Nationality Act of 1940 or the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 to be declared United States citizens. 13 Quite a few prevailed
by convincing the Courts that they had no reasonable alternative to
performing the expatriative act.
In recent years the issue of voluntariness has lost importance in
most loss of nationality proceedings, be they administrative or judi-
cial. Americans now living abroad rarely perform an expatriative act
under conditions that threaten life, liberty, or the ability to subsist.
As a consequence of the 1967 Supreme Court's decision in Afroyim
v. Rusk, holding that expatriation depends upon assent of the citi-
zen, and the Court's affirmation and clarification of Afroyim in 1980
in Vance v. Terrazas, the issue principally pleaded and decided on
appeal has been whether one who performed an expatriative act in-
tended to relinquish citizenship." 4 Since 1967 there have been no
preceding the taking of the oath, showing that the person had asserted his
American citizenship and had protested against being required to enter the
service of, or swearing allegiance to, the foreign country. Such statement may
consist of records of the military or other authorities of the foreign govern-
ments or statements communicated by the person in question to an American
consulate or diplomatic mission requesting assistance in avoiding service in a
foreign army on the ground that he is an American citizen.
Id. ("Consular Regulations of the United States, Section 144, Note 2, as of August
1930").
113. Section 360 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1503 provides that one who has been held
to have been expatriated may institute a suit for a judgment declaring him or her to be a
United States citizen. Section 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1171, 1172,
had an analogous provision.
Of the war time and post-war cases, one authority has observed: "the Courts have been
very generous in accepting pleas of coercion, finding it present when the citizen's actions
were compelled by fear of injury, retaliation, imprisonment, fine, economic deprivation."
Gordon, The Citizen and the State: Power of Congress to Expatriate American Citizens,
53 GEo. L.J., 315, 340 (1964).
Gordon cites the following authority for his observation:
Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S 129 (1958) (conscription in totalitarian country);
Stipa v. Dulles, 233 F.2d 551 (3d Cir. 1956) (foreign government employment
induced by economic duress); Soccadato v. Dulles, 96 U.S. App. D.C. 337, 266
F.2d 243 (1955) (voting induced by fear and intimidation); Acheson v.
Murakami, 176 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1949) (renunciation in relocation camp for
Japanese, induced by mental fear and intimidation); Doreau v. Marshall, 170
F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1948) (acceptance of Vichy citizenship induced by fear).
114. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253
(1967). See infra part III.
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reported federal cases where a citizenship-claimant prevailed by ar-
guing that the expatriative act was done under duress. Of the more
than 200 decisions rendered on the merits since 1980 by the State
Department's Board of Appellate Review, fewer than twenty were
decided on the grounds that the appellant was subjected to duress.
Where duress was established, it usually consisted of parental or fil-
ial pressure or pressure by one in authority over the appellant."1 5
Two appeals were decided on the grounds that the appellant was
deemed incompetent to perform a voluntary expatriative act.116
B. Intent to Relinquish Citizenship
In the half century from 1915, when the Supreme Court began to
review statutory loss of nationality cases, to 1967, when it decided
Afroyim v. Rusk, the Court firmly rejected arguments that loss of
citizenship depended upon whether the citizen assented to loss, that
is, whether he intended to terminate citizenship. In so holding, the
Court gave priority to the power of Congress to prescribe expatria-
tion as a deterrent to conduct that might cause the government em-
barrassment or difficulties in the conduct of the nation's foreign
relations.
1. Mackenzie v. Hare and its Progency-Is the
Requirement of Intent of the Citizen to Retain or
Relinquish Citizenship a Gross Fiction?
In 1915 the Supreme Court heard arguments by the plaintiff,
Mrs. Mackenzie, that Congress has no power under the Constitution
to abridge the right of citizenship without the citizen's concur-
rence. 117 Section 3 of the Act of March 2, 1907 was invalid, she
.submitted, for the citizenship of affected persons like herself was an
incident of their birth in the United States and under the Constitu-
tion it became a right, privilege and immunity which could not be
taken away except as a punishment for a crime or for voluntary ex-
patriation." 8 "Expatriation" appellant maintained, "is evidenced
only by emigration, coupled with other acts indicating an intention
to transfer one's allegiance." And all the acts must be voluntary,
115. See, e.g., In re T.A.H., Jan 23, 1990; In re M.L., Oct. 23, 1989; In re H.H.L.,
Aug. 8, 1985.
116. See In re C.-S.S., Apr. 3, 1990; In re G.B.-S., Jul. 14, 1983.
117. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
118. Id. at 308.
"the result of a fixed determination to change the domicile and per-
manently reside elsewhere, as well as to throw off the former alle-
giance, and become a citizen or subject of a foreign power."119
The Court summarily rejected Mrs. Mackenzie's thesis, declaring
that her "contention is in exact antagonism to the statute. 1 20 The
Court made it clear that it considered the interest of the state in
efficient management of foreign relations superior to the personal in-
terests or rights of the plaintiff.
We concur with counsel that citizenship is of tangible worth, and we sym-
pathize with plaintiff in her desire to retain it and in her earnest assertion
of it. But there is involved more than personal considerations. As we have
seen, the legislation was urged by conditions of national moment. And this
is an answer to the apprehension of counsel that our construction of the
legislation will make every act, though lawful, as marriage, of course, is, a
renunciation of citizenship. The marriage of an American woman with a
foreigner has consequences of like kind, may involve national complications
of like kind, as her physical expatriation may involve. Therefore, as long as
the relation lasts it is made tantamount to expatriation. This is no arbitrary
exercise of government. It is one which, regarding the international aspects,judicial opinion has taken for granted would not only be valid but de-
manded. It is the conception of the legislation under review that such an act
may bring the Government into embarrassments and, it may be, into con-
troversies. It is as voluntary and distinctive as expatriation and its conse-
quence must be considered as elected.1 21
In 1950, the Supreme Court affirmed its earlier position that a
citizen's intent when an expatriative act is performed is irrelevant. In
Savorgnan v. United States, 22 the plaintiff, Mrs. Savorgnan argued
that she did not expatriate herself when she obtained naturalization
in Italy because she had no intention of endangering her American
citizenship or renouncing her allegiance to the United States. 123 Re-
jecting that contention, the Supreme Court declared: "There is no
suggestion in the statutory language [the Act of March 2, 1907 and
the Nationality Act of 1940] that the effect of the specified overt
acts, when voluntarily done, is conditioned upon the undisclosed in-
tent of the person doing them. 1 2 4 Noting that the United States had
long recognized the general undesirability of dual allegiances, the
Court stated that there was nothing in the Act of March 2, 1907
that
implies a congressional intent that, after an American citizen has performed
an overt act which spells expatriation under the wording of the statute, he,
nevertheless, can preserve for himself a duality of citizenship by showing his
intent or understanding to have been contrary to the usual legal conse-
quences of such an act.1 25
119. Id. at 310.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 312.
122. 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
123. Id. at 495.
124. Id. at 499-500.
125. Id. at 500.
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In 1958, stare decisis prevailed yet again when the Supreme
Court denied contentions that Congress lacked authority to termi-
nate a citizen's citizenship without that person's consent. In Perez v.
Brownell, a 5 to 4 decision, Justice Frankfurter, avatar of judicial
restraint, delivered the opinion of the Court. He confirmed that
under the applicable statute, as indeed under U.S. public policy since
the Bancroft treaties, expatriation was automatic for specified volun-
tary conduct, without regard to the intent of the actor.126 "Of course,
Congress can attach loss of citizenship only as a consequence of con-
duct engaged in voluntarily," he noted.127 Continuing, he pointed out
that the plaintiffs in Mackenzie v. Hare and Savorgnan v. United
States
voluntarily [engaged] in conduct to which acts of Congress attached the
consequence of denationalization irrespective of- and, in those cases, abso-
lutely contrary to-the intentions and desires of the individuals. Those two
cases mean nothing- indeed, they are deceptive-if their essential signifi-
cance is not rejection of the notion that the power of Congress to terminate
citizenship depends upon the citizen's assent. It is a distortion of those cases
to explain them away on a theory that a citizen's assent to denationalization
may be inferred from his having engaged in conduct that amounts to an
'abandonment of citizenship' or a 'transfer of allegiance.' Certainly an Act
of Congress cannot be invalidated by resting decisive precedents on a gross
fiction-a fiction baseless in law and contradicted by the facts of the
cases.
28
2. Afroyim v. Rusk: The Right to Remain a Citizen
unless Citizenship is Voluntarily Relinquished
Half a century after Henry James expatriated himself, the Su-
preme Court decided Afroyim v. Rusk. 29 The Court repudiated the
proposition that Congress has a constitutional power to prescribe ex-
patriation for performance of acts likely to encumber the smooth
conduct of foreign relations, regardless of the intent of the citizen
who performs such acts.
By 1967 the time was propitious for the Court to construe the
Constitution anew with respect to the right of citizenship, to reexam-
ine "the great immunities with which it surrounds the individual.' 30
In the years since it had decided Perez, the make-up and philosophy
126. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 48 (1958), overruled, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
127. Id. at 61.
128. Id. at 61-62. The Court accordingly affirmed the loss of citizenship of one
who performed the statutorily proscribed act of voting in a foreign political election,
although he did not intend to divest himself of citizenship.
129. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
130. B. Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 76 (1921).
of the Court had changed markedly. As has been aptly observed, the
Supreme Court under Chief Justice Warren "came to be, for much
of the time, the branch of government in which the libertarian, egali-
tarian, and humanitarian impulses beat the strongest." 131 Of the five
justices who upheld loss of the petitioner's citizenship in Perez, Jus-
tices Burton and Frankfurter were no longer on the Court, and Jus-
tice Brennan, who in 1963 expressed "some felt doubts about the
correctness of Perez," had gone over to the position of the Perez
dissenters.1 32
The Afroyim Court was influenced by the fact that "Perez [had]
been a source of controversy" ever since it was decided, and that "in
the other cases decided with and since Perez, [the] Court [had] con-
sistently invalidated on a case-by-case basis various other statutory
sections providing for involuntary expatriation."133 These cases, as
well as many commentators, the Court said, cast great doubt upon
the soundness of Perez.134 Furthermore, the dissent of Chief Justice
Warren in Perez was a powerful organon for the Court.', The prob-
lem whether forfeiture of citizenship for voting in a foreign political
election exceeds the bounds of the Constitution is fundamental, the
Chief Justice had maintained in Perez, "and must be resolved upon
fundamental considerations."' 36 The Citizenship Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution should be construed as writ-
ten, he stated; if it were, it would be apparent that "this priceless
right is immune from the exercise of governmental powers.' 37
Justice Black, who delivered the opinion of a divided (5 to 4)
Court, framed the issue as the Chief Justice had done in his dissent
131. A. Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 354 (1987).
132. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 187 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
Three of the four dissenters in Perez (Justice Whittaker left the Court before 1967),
Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Black and Douglas, joined Justices Brennan and For-
tas to make the majority in Afroyim.
133. 387 U.S. at 255.
The cases cited were Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 129 (1958); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Schneider v.
Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
134. Id. at 256.
The Court cited the following writings: Agata, Involuntary Expatriation and Schnei-
der v. Rusk, 27 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1965); Hurst, Can Congress Take Away Citizen-
ship?, 29 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 62 (1956); Kurland, Foreword: Equal in Origin and
Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HARV,
L. REV. 143, 169-75 (1964); Comment, Constitutional Law-Citizenship-Power of
Congress to Effect Involuntary Expatriation, 56 MICH. L. REV. 1142 (1958); Note, For-feiture of Citizenship Through Congressional Enactments, 21 U. CIN. L. REv. 59
(1952); 40 CORNELL L.Q. 365 (1955); 25 S. CAL. L. REV. 196 (1952). "But," the Court
added, "see, e.g., Comment, The Expatriation Act of 1954, 64 YALE L.J. 1164 (1955)."
387 U.S. at 256.
135. Perez, 356 U.S. at 62-78 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 63.
137. Id. at 77-78.
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in Perez. "The fundamental issue before this Court here, as it was in
Perez, is whether Congress can consistently with the Fourteenth
Amendment enact a law stripping an American of his citizenship
which he has never voluntarily renounced or given up."1 8 That issue
could only be determined, Justice Black stated, by a straight-forward
construction of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution which
[p]rovides its own constitutional rule in language calculated completely to
control the status of citizenship: 'All persons born or naturalized in the
United States... are citizens of the United States ... .' There is no indica-
tion in these words of a fleeting citizenship, good at the moment it is ac-
quired but subject to destruction by the Government at any time. Rather
the Amendment can most reasonably be read as defining a citizenship
which a citizen keeps unless he voluntarily relinquishes it. Once acquired,
this Fourteenth Amendment citizenship was not to be shifted, cancelled, or
diluted at the will of the Federal Government, the States, or any other gov-
ernmental unit.139
Continuing, the opinion asserted that to uphold the power of Con-
gress to take away citizenship because one voted in a foreign politi-
cal election (as the petitioner in the case before the Court had done)
"would be equivalent to holding that Congress has the power to
'abridge,' 'affect,' 'restrict the effect of,' and 'take. . . away' citizen-
ship."1 4 ° Justice Black concluded:
138. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 256 (1967).
The petitioner was expatriated under section 401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 8
U.S.C. § 801 (1946) for voting in a foreign political election.
139. Id. at 262.
140. Id. at 267.
Justice Black also drew heavily on the Court's opinion in United States v. Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). In Wong Kim Ark, he noted, the Court held that Congress
could do nothing to abridge or affect the petitioner's birthright citizenship. 387 U.S. at
266.
Continuing, Justice Black recalled that the Court in Wong Kim Ark cited Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's "well-considered and oft-quoted dictum" in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 9 Wheat 738 (1824) that "'Congress has power to confer citizenship, not a
power to take it away.'" Id. Justice Black then cited the Court's declaration in Wong
Kim Ark (169 U.S. at 703) that:
Congress having no power to abridge the rights conferred by the Constitution
upon those who have become naturalized citizens by virtue of acts of Congress,
a fortiori no act . . . of Congress . . . can affect citizenship acquired as a
birthright, by virtue of the Constitution itself .... The Fourteenth Amend-,
ment, while it leaves the power, where it was before, in Congress, to regulate
naturalization, has conferred no authority upon Congress to restrict the effect
of birth, declared by the Constitution to constitute a sufficient and complete
right to citizenship.
Id. Accordingly, Justice Black asserted:
To uphold Congress' power to take away a man's citizenship because he voted
in a foreign election in violation of sec. 401(e) would be equivalent to holding
Our holding we think is the only one that can stand in view of the language
and the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, and our construction of
that Amendment, we believe, comports more nearly than Perez with the
principles of liberty and equal justice to all that the entire Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted to guarantee. Citizenship is no light trifle to be
jeopardized any moment Congress decides to do so under the name of one
of its general or implied grants of power. In some instances, loss of citizen-
ship can mean that a man is left without the protection of citizenship in any
country in the world-as A man without country. Citizenship in this Nation
is a part of a cooperative affair. Its citizenry is the country and the country
is its citizenry. The very nature of our free government makes it completely
incongruous to have a rule of law under which a group of citizens tempora-
rily in office can deprive another group of citizens of their citizenship. We
hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, protect
every citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible destruction of
his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race. Our holding does no more
than to give to this citizen that which is his own, a constitutional right to
remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that
citizenship.'
Having concluded that its fifty-year old position was untenable be-
cause it plainly was inconsistent with the Constitution, the Court
abandoned it and expressly overruled Perez.
Justice Harlan, in a dissent marked by his wonted intellectual
rigor (and deference to precedent), found the historical evidence ad-
duced by the majority to support its position "wholly inconclu-
sive." '142 He submitted that "nothing in the history, purposes or lan-
guage of the [citizenship] clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment]
suggests that it forbids Congress in all circumstances to withdraw
the citizenship of an unwilling citizen.' 43 The majority's error, he
asserted acerbly, was that the construction it placed on the Citizen-
ship Clause "rests in the last analysis simply on the Court's ipse
that Congress has the power to 'abridge,' 'affect,' 'restrict the effect of,' and
'take ... away' citizenship.
387 U.S. at 267.
141. Id. at 267-68.
The Court's decision voided section 401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940 and conse-
quently the analogous provision of INA, § 349(a)(5).
142. Id. at 291.
Justice Harlan's dissent, in which Justices Clark, Stewart and White joined, cited evi-
dence which he said the majority overlooked in concluding that the Citizenship Clause
absolutely protects citizenship from Congressional divestment.
While the debate on the Act of 1868 [declaring expatriation to be a natural
and inherent right] was still in progress, negotiations were completed on the
first of a series of bilateral expatriation treaties [The Bancroft Treaties], which
'initiated this country's policy of automatic divestment of citizenship for speci-
fied conduct affecting out foreign relations.' Perez v. Brownell, supra, at 48.
[356 U.S. 44 (1958)]. Seven such treaties were negotiated in 1868 and 1869
alone; each was ratified by the Senate. If, as the Court now suggests, it was
'abundantly clear' to Congress in 1868 that the Citizenship Clause had taken
from its hands the power of expatriation, it is quite difficult to understand why
these conventions were negotiated, or why, once negotiated, they were not im-
mediately repudiated by the Senate.
Id. at 290-91 (footnotes omitted).
143. Id. at 292.
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dixit, evincing little more, it is quite apparent, than the present ma-
jority's own distaste for the expatriation power."'1 44 He predicted
that the ambiguity of the phrase "voluntary relinquishment" of citi-
zenship would cause only confusion.145
Whatever the merits of Justice Harlan's criticisms of the Court's
reasoning, Afroyim was a decision of seismic dimension, one where
"the creative element in the judicial process [found] its opportunity
and power.' 146 It remained only for the Court to clarify what it
meant by "voluntary relinquishment" of citizenship and to rule on
the standard and allocation of the burden of proof in loss of national-
ity proceedings. The opportunity came in 1980 when it heard and
decided Vance v. Terrazas,47 and in so doing unanimously affirmed
the essential proposition of Afroyim that losp of citizenship depends
on whether the citizen assents to its loss.
3. Vance v. Terrazas Clarifies Afroyim
"Afroyim emphasized that loss of citizenship requires the individ-
ual's 'assent,' 387 U.S., at 257, in addition to his voluntary commis-
sion of the expatriating act," the Supreme Court stated in Ter-
razas.148 Continuing, it declared: "It is difficult to understand that
'assent' to loss of citizenship would mean anything less than an in-
tent to relinquish citizenship, whether the intent is expressed in
words or is found as a fair inference from proved conduct.' 49 "In
the last analysis," the Court asserted, "expatriation depends on the
will of the citizen rather than on the will of Congress and its assess-
ment of his conduct.'1 5 0
The Supreme Court believed it would be inconsistent with
Afroyim to treat the expatriating acts enumerated in the statute "as
144. Id. at 293.
145. Id. at 269 n.1.
"Whatever the Court's position," he wrote,
[i]t has assumed that voluntariness is here a term of fixed meaning; in fact, of
course, it has been employed to describe both a specific intent to renounce citi-
zenship, and the uncoerced commission of an act conclusively deemed by law to
be a relinquishment of citizenship. Until the Court indicates with greater preci-
sion what it means by 'assent,' today's opinion will surely cause still greater
confusion in this area of the law.
Id.
146. B. Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 165 (1921).
147. 444 U.S. 252 (1980). Justices Marshall, Brennan, Stevens and Stewart dis-
sented, but on other grounds.
148. Id. at 260.
149. Id.
150. Id.
the equivalent of or as conclusive evidence of the indispensable vol-
untary assent of the citizen," although any of the specified acts
might be "highly persuasive evidence" of a purpose to abandon
citizenship.15'
Upholding the constitutionality of the statutory provision that the
government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the citizen intended to relinquish United States nation-
ality, the Court rejected the argument that proof of intent to relin-
quish citizenship should be by "clear and convincing" evidence. 152
Proving intent (even by a preponderance of the evidence) is in itself
a "heavy burden," the Court observed. 53
Afroyim as elaborated by Terrazas manifestly was a watershed in
the law of expatriation. It delineated, probably once and for all, the
rights of the citizen and the powers of Congress with respect to those
rights. The question whether as a matter of public policy it is desira-
ble that the state should not be allowed to deter its citizens by threat
of expatriation from doing things abroad which might complicate the
conduct of foreign policy is now an academic one. The Supreme
Court has ruled that as a constitutional matter the interest of the
state in the untrammeled conduct of foreign relations is subordinate
to the absolute grant of citizenship of the first section of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Afroyim as clarified by Terrazas has had the somewhat surprising
consequence of sanctioning duality of citizenship and allegiance.
Such status (other than that which resulted from operation of law,
that is, from circumstances over which the individual had no control)
has long been regarded negatively in the United States.'5 4 As the
151. Id. at 261 (quoting Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 139 (1958) (Black.
J., concurring)).
152. Id. at 267.
Section 349(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1481(b), provides in
pertinent part that "whenever the loss of United States nationality is put in issue in any
action or proceeding. . ., the burden shall be upon the person or party claiming that such
loss occurred, to establish such claim by a preponderance of the evidence." (See supra
note 96).
The United States Court of Appeals for the-7th Circuit, from whose decision in Ter-
razas v. Vance the government sought a writ of certiorari, had held that:
A clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence standard is the minimum burden
of proof that can satisfactorily guarantee that the individual's interest in the
retention of his citizenship is protected adequately. . . .We therefore conclude
that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to prove by clear,
convincing and unequivocal evidence that plaintiff voluntarily relinquished his
United States citizenship.
Terrazas v. Vance, 577 F.2d 7, 12 (7th Cir. 1978).
153. Terrazas v. Vance, 444 U.S. at 267.
154. H.R. Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1906-1907). See also
Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 500, 501 (1950):
[T]emporary or limited duality of citizenship has arisen inevitably from differ-
ences in the laws of the respective nations as to when naturalization and expa-
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State Department's Citizenship Board of 1906 said in support of its
recommendations on expatriation which became the Act of March 2,
1907:
"It is true that because of conflicting laws on the subject of citizenship in
different countries a child may be born to a double allegiance; but no man
should be permitted deliberately to place himself in a position where his
services may be claimed by more than one government and his allegiance be
due to more than one.'
55
However, as judicial and administrative appellate decisions ren-
dered in the past twenty years have shown, if the government has
been unable to prove that a citizen who performed an expatriative
act intended to relinquish his citizenship, duality of citizenship or
allegiance has been the result. Despite the injunction of all three
branches of government over the years that dual allegiances should
not be countenanced, one would be hard pressed to adduce evidence
that such outcomes have seriously burdened the conduct of the for-
eign relations of the United States.
Justice Brennen is of the view that the court overlooked the real
meaning of Afroyim. The proper conclusion to be drawn from
Afroyim, he asserted, is that only formal renunciation of United
States nationality will, as a constitutional matter, support a holding
that a citizen intended to terminate his relationship to the United
States.156 Dissenting in Terrazas, he pointed out that Terrazas was
governed by Afroyim, which emphasized the crucial importance of
citizenship, and "held unequivocally that a citizen has 'a constitu-
tional right to remain a citizen. . .unless he voluntarily relinquishes
that citizenship.' ,,157 Continuing, the Justice noted that Afroyim
held that "'the only way citizenship . . .could be lost was by the
voluntary renunciation or abandonment by the citizen himself.' ",15,
triation shall become effective. There is nothing, however, in the Act of 1907
that implies a congressional intent that, after an American citizen has per-
formed an overt act which spells expatriation under the wording of the statute,
he, nevertheless, can preserve for himself a duality of citizenship by showing
his intent or understanding to have been contrary to the usual legal conse-
quence of such an act.
And see supra note 60 and accompanying text. Secretary of State Hay said in 1898:
It is inconsistent for an individual to bear true allegiance at the same time to
two different sovereigns, and the exercise of the right of citizenship under any
alien sovereignty must be regarded as a voluntary assumption of the obligations
of allegiance to such sovereignty.
III Moore, supra note 16 § 469, at 735.
155. H.R. Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1906-1907).
156. Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 274 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 274-75 (quoting Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 258, 268 (1967).
158. Id. at 275 (quoting 387 U.S. at 266).
The Afroyim court further held, he observed, that "because Con-
gress could not 'abridge,' 'affect,' 'restrict the effect of,' or 'take
away citizenship,' Congress was 'without power to rob a citizen of
his citizenship' because he voted in a foreign election."' 9 In the Jus-
tice's opinion, the same "clearly must be true of the government's
attempt to strip appellee [Terrazas] of citizenship because he swore
an oath of allegiance to Mexico."'' 0 Congress provided for a proce-
dure by which one may formally renounce citizenship, he contin-
ued.16' In Terrazas, the United States conceded that appellee had
not renounced his citizenship under that procedure. It therefore fol-
lowed, the Justice concluded, "because one can lose citizenship only
by voluntarily renouncing it and because appellee had not formally
renounced his, I would hold that he remains a citizen."' 6 2
Justice Brennan's exegesis of Afroyim, emblematic of the great
jurist's solicitude for the citizen's constitutional rights, has undenia-
ble force and logic. Formal renunciation of United States citizenship
according to law is undeniably the sole statutory expatriative act
that expresses unambiguously a will and purpose to terminate alle-
giance to the United States. It is unlikely, however, that the Su-
preme Court as presently constituted will accept Justice Brennan's
construction of Afroyim. It seems clear that the Terrazas Court was
of the view that Congress has the constitutional power to specify
what acts, if done voluntarily and with the intention of relinquishing
citizenship, will result in, expatriation. Accordingly, the Court left no
doubt that since the seven statutory expatriative acts are so condi-
tioned, they are constitutionally valid. Nonetheless, Justice Bren-
nan's Terrazas dissent makes it pertinent and respectable to question
whether any vital government interest would be frustrated were the
United States, like other civilized nations, to prescribe only one
ground for loss of nationality.
4. Judicial and Administrative Experience after
Terrazas
While the Supreme Court's decision in Terrazas clarified points
left ambiguous by Afroyim, it did not define conduct that would sup-
port a finding that a citizen who performed a statutory expatriative
159. Id. (quoting 387 U.S. at 267).
160. Id. at 275.
161. Id. (citing INA § 348(a)(6); 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6)).
That section now prescribes how one may formally renounce citizenship in the United
States in wartime. Before the INA was amended in 1978 to renumber the acts of expa-
triation, section 349(a)(6) prescribed loss of citizenship for formal renunciation of citi-
zenship before a consular officer in a foreign state. Section 349(a)(5) is now the statutory
provision for formal renunciation in a foreign state.
162. Id.
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act intended to terminate citizenship; the matter was left to the in-
ferior courts to determine.
Since 1980, courts in four circuits have decided cases brought by
citizenship claimants seeking relief from an adverse nationality de-
termination made by the Department of State, and in doing so have
made rules for determining conduct that manifests intent to relin-
quish citizenship. In three cases, the courts held that the government
carried its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the citizen intended to relinquish nationality by establishing
that the citizen not only performed a valid expatriative act volunta-
rily, but at the same time also expressly renounced United States
citizenship, and subsequently acted in a manner inconsistent with
that of one who considered himself a United States citizen.6 3 In a
fourth case, the government sustained its burden of proof by estab-
lishing that a citizen voluntarily made a formal renunciation of
United States citizenship in the manner prescribed by law and the
Secretary of State.'
Another case held that the government failed to meet its burden
of proof, even though the citizen involved signed a foreign naturali-
zation application which stated that he renounced United States na-
tionality; the court considered that the circumstances surrounding
his signing the renunciatory statement were too ambiguous to estab-
lish an intent to relinquish citizenship. 65 Another American citizen
prevailed because the court found in statements he made immedi-
ately before and after he entered the parliament of a foreign state a
clear expression of intent to retain citizenship.' 66
Although the courts-have decided only a handful of loss of nation-
ality cases since Terrazas, the criteria they applied in those cases
with respect to conduct that is sufficient to support a finding of in-
tent to relinquish citizenship have been, as far as they go, useful,
indeed essential, guidelines for both the Board of Appellate Review
and the Department of State to use in making (it is hoped) sound
163. Terrazas v. Haig, 653 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1981), (appellant made an oath of
allegiance to Mexico with an express declaration of renunciation of American nationality
and sought relief from selective service on grounds he was not a U.S. citizen); Richards
v. Secretary of State, 752 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1985) (appellant obtained naturalization
in Canada, declared that he renounced allegiance to the United States, and generally
held himself out to United States authorities as a Canadian citizen). On facts rather
similar to Richards, see Meretsky v. Department of Justice, No. 86-5184 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (mem.).
164. Maldonado-Sanchez v. Shultz, 706 F. Supp. 54 (D.D.C. 1989).
165. Parness v. Shultz, 669 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1987).
166. Kahne v. Shultz, 653 F. Supp. 1486 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
and reasonably consistent decisions on loss or retention of citizen-
ship. Nonetheless, loss of citizenship cases are fact-specific, and
there are no simple certainties when it comes to making a judgment
on the issue of intent to relinquish citizenship. Each case must be
carefully culled to extract the relevant elements of decision.
To no type of case is the foregoing generalization more apposite
than to one of loss of nationality as a result of procuring naturaliza-
tion in a foreign state, Until fairly recently, the Board of Appellate
Review and the Department of State have frequently differed about
the conclusions to be drawn from a situation where an American
citizen has obtained naturalization in a foreign state which does not
require applicants to renounce their previous nationality. Typically
in such cases, after obtaining naturalization, the American citizen
may do nothing for a long time to show affirmatively an intent to
retain U.S. citizenship. The citizen may even later state that he or
she assumed naturalization would result in loss of U.S. citizenship,
yet do nothing after naturalization expressly derogatory of United
States citizenship. Such cases may be described as ones of "simple
naturalization."
Approximately 120 of the 200 cases the Board has decided on the
merits since 1980 have involved naturalization in a foreign state.167
Of those 120, a substantial majority were appeals by persons who
were subjects of "simple naturalization" in a foreign state. In decid-
ing such cases, the Board has rejected the Department's arguments
that failure affirmatively to behave as an American citizen after nat-
uralization manifests an intent at the time the act was done to relin-
quish citizenship. In the Board's view, passive conduct, although
open to criticism, does not warrant an inference of prior intent to
terminate citizenship. Acts of omission, the Board has said, are too
equivocal to permit one to make a comfortable decision with respect
to the priceless right of citizenship. Doubts about the facts must to
the extent reasonably possible be resolved in favor of the citizen. 10 8
Accordingly, in about 40 cases of "simple naturalization" the Board
reversed the Department's holding of loss of citizenship. In roughly
another 40 cases, with generally similar fact situations, the Depart-
ment in effect conceded that it could not prevail before the Board,
and requested that the Board remand the case so that it might quash
167. See 4-19 Ops. Bd. of App. Rev. (1980-1989).
168. See Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1958):
This Court has said that in a denaturalization case, 'instituted. . .for the pur-
pose of depriving one of the precious right of citizenship previously conferred
we believe the facts and the law should be construed as far as is reasonably
possible in favor of the citizen.' Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118,
122.
See also United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 197 (1956) (concurring opinion):
"When we deal with citizenship we tread on sensitive ground."
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the certificate of loss of nationality.
In the remaining one-third of the naturalization cases, the Board
affirmed the Department's determination of loss of citizenship.
Drawing on apposite judicial precent, the Board took the position
that if a citizen obtained naturalization in a foreign state, declared
that he renounced United States citizenship, and subsequently did or
said nothing of sufficient evidential weight to cast doubt on the abju-
ration of American citizenship made upon doing the expatriative act,
the evidence showed preponderantly an intend to relinquish
citizenship.
5. The Department of State Adopts a New Evidentiary
Standard to Determine the Issue of Intent
In the spring of 1990, the Department of State made a policy de-
cision of first importance with respect to the processing of loss of
nationality cases. The Department adopted a new standard of evi-
dence to determine the issue of intent to relinquish citizenship.169
The new standard is based on the premise that American citizens
actually intend to retain United States citizenship even when they
perform one of the following acts denominated by statute as expa-
triative: (1) obtain naturalization in a foreign state; (2) subscribe to
routine declarations of allegiance to a foreign state; or (3) accept
non-policy level employment with a foreign government. A citizen
who performs one of the foregoing acts and wishes to retain citizen-
ship, the Department states, need not, prior to doing so, submit a
statement or evidence of intent to retain citizenship; an intent to re-
tain citizenship will be presumed.
The Department emphasizes that the premise of intent to retain
citizenship is not applicable when the citizen (1) formally renounces
United States citizenship as provided by law; (2) takes a policy-level
position with a foreign government; (3) is convicted of treason; or
(4) performs a statutory expatriative act and behaves in a manner so
inconsistent with intent to retain citizenship that the conclusion is
inescapable that the citizen intended to relinquish citizenship. The
169. The new evidentiary standard to determine the issue of intent to relinquish
citizenship and instructions regarding its implementation were communicated to all dip-
lomatic and consular posts by telegram dated April 16, 1990. From that date the Depart-
ment has applied the new evidentiary standard in making adjudications of all potential
loss of nationality cases submitted to it. On September 21, 1990, the Department made
public an information sheet entitled "Advice about Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship and
Dual Nationality," explaining the new standard and how it is being implemented.
fourth category, the Department observes, is very rare.
An individual who has performed any one of the seven statutory
expatriating acts and who wishes to terminate citizenship may do so
by affirming in writing to a United States consular officer that the
act was performed with the intention of relinquishing citizenship. A
citizen always has the option of making a formal renunciation of
nationality. The Department will apply the premise of intent to re-
tain citizenship to cases it has adjudicated previously. 170
Finally, the Department points out that when a United States citi-
zen obtains naturalization in a foreign state and is held not to have
lost citizenship, the individual may consequently possess dual nation-
ality. The Department adds that while the United States does not
favor dual nationality as a matter of public policy, it does recognize
its existence in individual cases.
How to explain this significant departure of the Department? The
Department concluded that it is apparent after studying the adminis-
trative disposition of loss of nationality cases during recent years,
and decisions of the Board of Appellate Review, that, a new ap-
proach should be adopted to simplify and make as uniform as possi-
ble the adjudication of loss of nationality cases in the Department
inasmuch as the issue of intent to relinquish citizenship is so inher-
ently and uniquely difficult to determine in many types of cases. The
new standard, it evidently is hoped, will ensure that the Depart-
ment's obligation under the statute to act where there clearly is in-
tent to relinquish citizenship remains intact, and will obviate the
need to defend protracted appeals involving ambiguous conduct and
often confusing indicia of intent.
The new evidentiary standard reveals the Departments' enlight-
ened approach to its responsibilities under the statute and is eloquent
acknowledgment that citizenship is indeed a right beyond price. By
requiring that holdings of loss of nationality rest on the firmest possi-
ble evidentiary footing, the new standard should ensure that citizen-
ship will be forfeited only when a citizen gives an unmistakable sig-
nal he or she wishes to terminate allegiance to the United States.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DETERMINATIONS
OF Loss OF CITIZENSHIP
Today, a person who is the subject of an adverse citizenship deter-
mination by the Department of State has administrative and judicial
170. The new evidentiary standard is not, of course, applicable to cases appealed to
the Board of Appellate Review where the Board has made a decision on the merits up-
holding the adverse determination of the Department. Decisions of the Board are final,
subject only to the right of either party to move for reconsideration of the Board's deci-
sion. 22 C.F.R. §§ 7.9, 7.10 (1990).
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avenues of relief guaranteed by statute or regulations having the
force of law.
The Board of Appellate Review of the Department of State, an
autonomous, quasi-judicial body established in 1967, hears and de-
cides appeals by individuals who have been the subject of an adverse
citizenship decision.1 71 In considering appeals from such determina-
tions, the Board determines whether an individual received proce-
dural and substantive due process when the Department decided he
or she forfeited United States nationality by performing a statutory
expatriative act in a foreign state. If the Board concludes that the
Department's decision is contrary to law or fact, it will grant relief
by reversing that decision.
Decisions of the Board are not reviewable by an officer of the De-
partment of State. They are final, subject to the right of either party
to move for consideration. An appellant who has been unsuccessful
before the Board may institute an action in a federal district court
for a judgment declaring the appellant to be a United States
citizen.'72
From 1940 to 1967 a panel in the Department of State reviewed
loss of nationality decisions, but it lacked the autonomy that the
Board of Appellate Review enjoys today. 173 Before 1940, however,
there was no departmental procedure for appellate review of adverse
nationality decisions. Persons like Henry James who expatriated
themselves under the provisions of the Act of 1907, or before that
time pursuant to rulings made by the Secretary of State, might re-
monstrate with the Department, but to judge from the digests appar-
ently few, if any, did so.
A. Judicial Review-A Trial de Novo
With respect to judicial review, the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 prescribes that a person in the United States who claims
a right or privilege as a national of the United States and who is
171. For a comprehensive study of the Board of Appellate Review, see James, The
Board of Appellate Review of the Department of State: The Right to Appellate Review
of Administrative Determinations of Loss of Nationality, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 261
(1986).
The Board derives its authority from federal regulations, Part 7 of Title 22, Code of
Federal Regulations (22 C.F.R. § 7.2 (1989)).
172. The right to institute such an action is provided by INA. § 360, 8 U.S.C. §
1503 (1988). The Department of State has no judicial recourse from an adverse decision
of the Board.
173. James, supra note 167, at 265-69.
denied such right or privilege may, within five years after the final
administrative denial thereof, institute an action in federal district
court for a judgment declaring him or her to be a United States
citizen.'74 The act also provides a procedure whereby a person not in
the United States may enter to prosecute such an action.
The Nationality Act of 1940 had a similar but more liberal provi-
sion which read in pertinent part as follows:
If any person who claims a right or privilege as a national of the United
States is denied such right or privilege by any Department or agency, or
executive official thereof, upon the ground that he is not a national of the
United States such person. . .regardless of whether he is within the United
States or abroad, may institute an action against the head of such Depart-
ment or agency in the District Court of the United States for the District of
Columbia or in the district court of the United States for the district in
which such person claims a permanent residence for a judgment declaring
him to be a national of the United States.
175
The Cabinet Committee appointed by President Roosevelt to re-
view, recommend and codify the nationality laws of the United
States recommended no provision for judicial review in what became
the Nationality Act of 1940. The Committee was of the opinion that
such a provision was unnecessary. 17 6 The Committee asserted that:
It may be added that a person who shall have been denied recognition
abroad as an American national by a diplomatic or consular officer of the
United States, upon the ground that such person had expatriated himself by
the performance of one of the acts specified in this chapter would not be
without a legal remedy in case he should deem the ruling in his case unjus-
tified and such ruling should be upheld by the Department of State.
177
The Committee pointed out that aggrieved persons had recourse to
the writ of habeas corpus and a new (1934) statutory provision for a
declaratory judgment. 78 The Senate, however, did not accept the
Committee's recommendation and insisted that there be a specific
provision for judicial review. Indeed, the only important amendment
the Senate made to the House bill was the section on judicial review.
A number of suits were instituted in federal courts under the judi-
cial review provisions of the Nationality Act of 1940, the outcome of
174. INA § 360, 8 U.S.C § 1503 (1988).
175. The Nationality Act of 1940 § 503, ch. V, 54 Stat. 1137, 1171-72 (1940).
In 1950 the Senate Judiciary Committee, which then was looking into the immigration
and nationality laws of the United States, considered the foregoing provision too liberal.
"It has been subject to broad interpretation," the Committee stated, "and. . .has been
used in a considerable number of cases to gain entry into the United States where no
such right existed." The Committee therefore recommended that the privilege of institut-
ing an action for a declaratory judgment be limited to persons in the United States (this
recommendation was not adopted) and that the limit on the right be five years after the
finding that the person is not a citizen.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SYS-
TEMS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 776, 777 (1950).
176. See supra note 82, at 78.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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which, as one commentator quite validly noted, "emphasized the
value of this provision in protecting the individual against arbitrary
administrative determinations. 1 79 Before enactment of the Nation-
ality Act of 1940, a person who wished to obtain a judicial determi-
nation of citizenship had to rely on common law remedies to get into
court, although the Act of June 14, 1934 thereafter provided the
alternative avenue of a declaratory judgment. 80
B. The Years Without Assurance of Judicial Review
From the earliest years of the Republic, federal courts (and state
courts with respect to the citizenship provisions of state constitu-
tions) were called upon to make determinations of citizenship. The
disposition of causes of action involving, for example, title to real
property and the right to inherit, turned on whether the court con-
cluded that the party claiming title was or was not a United States
citizen. The early cases laid down no uniform rules on what acts
would or would not constitute expatriation, in part because federal
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, generally followed the doc-
trine of indefeasible allegiance.' 8 ' With passage of the Act of July
179. Roche, The Loss of American Nationality-The Development of Statutory
Expatriation, 99 U. oF PA. L. REV. 25, 69 (1951).
Roche cited seven cases brought under section 503 that had been won by the govern-
ment in the ten years from 1940 to 1950, and 14 lost by the United States in the same
period.
180. Codification, supra note 82, at 78.
Provision for a declaratory judgment was made by the Act of June 14, 1934, 48 Stat.
955 which amended section 274 of the Judicial Code.
181. See Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795); Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 64 (1804); M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch.) 209 (1808); The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (Wheat.) 283 (1822); Inglis v.
Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830); Shanks v. DuPont, 28 U.S.
(3 Pet.) 242 (1830). These early opinions of the United States Supreme Court are nota-
ble for the justices' disquisitions on whether a citizen might expatriate himself without
sanction of the state, but they "manifestly had settled nothing, and the 'great question as
to the right of expatriation', was unresolved." Gordon, The Citizen and the State Power
of Congress to Expatriate American Citizens, 53 GEO. L.J., 315, 321-22 (1965).
Courts also were called upon to make citizenship determinations in order to decide
such practical matters as whether a plaintiff had standing to sue in federal court. See
Jennes v. Landes, 85 Fed. 801 (N.D. Wash. 1897). There the court was required to
determine whether the complainant had lost her United States citizenship when she mar-
ried a British subject and went with him to live in Canada. The complainant, who
brought the action in federal court for an accounting with respect to certain property she
allegedly owned in the State of Washington, argued that she had expatriated herself and
therefore might sue in federal court on the grounds of diversity of citizenship. The court
agreed with the complainant that she lost her U.S. citizenship when she became a British
subject, and accordingly ruled that she might sue in federal court.
Cf. Comitis v. Parkerson, 56 Fed. 556 (E.D. La. 1893), appeal dismissed, 163 U.S.
27, 1868 the controversy about whether the doctrine of perpetual
allegiance applied in the United States ended, and federal courts
held that the consent of the state was not necessary to effect expatri-
ation.' 2 Until around the turn of the century, however, there seems
to have been little recourse to the courts by persons who were held to
have lost (or not to have acquired) citizenship.
In the last quarter of the 19th century, while the Secretary of
State determined questions of expatriation without benefit of legisla-
tive mandate, officials of the Department of the Treasury, and, after
1905, of the Commerce and Labor Department, decided citizenship
status in exclusion and deportation proceedings pursuant to the so-
called Chinese Exclusion Acts and other legislative enactments.18 3
Many persons who were denied entry into the United States or were
detained pending deportation because they allegedly were aliens
sought judicial review of their claim of United States citizenship by
petition for the "great writ," habeas corpus.
C. Habeas Corpus as Vehicle to Obtain Judicial Review
The Cabinet Committee which studied the nationality laws
pointed out in its 1939 report that a person who was denied entry
into the United States might
upon arrival at a port of entry into the United States, and denial of entry as
a national, resort to habeas corpus proceedings upon the ground that he is
entitled to enter the United States as a national thereof. There seems to be
no doubt as to the possibility of having a judicial decision in cases of this
kind, if a person applying for admission to the United States as a national
thereof submits substantial evidence of facts upon which his claim to Amer-
ican nationality may be based is denied a fair hearing upon the facts, Chin
Yow v. United States (1907), 208 U.S. 8, or the facts being admitted, he is
denied admission upon the ground that under the law he has not American
681 (1896). The complainant, who married a foreign national but lived with him in Loui-
siana rather than departing from the United States, was held not to have lost her United
States citizenship, and thus had no standing to sue in federal court for an accounting on
property she owned in Louisiana.
182. Jennes, 85 Fed. at 801; Comitis, 56 Fed. at 556. There are few reported cases
on this subject.
183. In 1882, Chinese immigration was suspended for ten years. Act of May 6,
1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, as amended by Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115.
However, Congress did not lift the suspension after ten years, but in actuality, enacted
an even more stringent exclusion law. By the Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25.
Subsequent legislation kept the bar firmly in place.
The Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084, established classes of aliens other
than Chinese who should be excluded, and created the office of Superintendent of Immi-
gration in the Department of the Treasury. Inspection officers were authorized to ex-
amine persons wishing to enter and determine their eligibility. The decisions of such
officers were to be final, unless an appeal was taken to the Superintendent of Immigra-
tion whose decisions were reviewable by the Secretary of the Treasury.
By the Act of February 14, 1903, ch. 552, 32 Stat. 825, jurisdiction over immigration
was transferred to the Department of Commerce and Labor.
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nationality, Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657 (1927).&4
With respect to judicial review of citizenship by persons held in
deportation proceedings, the Cabinet Committee stated:
The question of nationality may also be presented to a court for determina-
tion through habeas corpus proceedings in the case of a person who has
previously entered the United States and is held for deportation from the
United States as an alien but who claims the right to remain in the United
States upon the ground that he is a national thereof (Ng Fung Ho, 259
U.S. 276 (1921); United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Todd, 263 U.S. 149
(1923)).185
"Some of the most important decisions of the courts in this coun-
try concerning nationality," the Committee added, "have been ob-
tained through habeas corpus proceedings," citing United States v.
Wong Kim Ark.1 86
Wong Kim Ark is truly a landmark case, notable not only as an
illustration of the successful deployment of a petition for habeas
corpus, but more significantly for the great constitutional principle it
expounded. The petitioner, upon return from a short trip to China,
was denied entry and detained, pending deportation, by the collector
of the port of San Francisco on the pretense that he was not a citizen
of the United States. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in
district court, which issued the writ. The government appealed to the
Supreme Court, which held that the writ was properly issued. The
Court concluded that the petitioner, although born in the United
States of parents who were subjects of the Emperor of China, be-
came a United States citizen at birth by virtue of the first section of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Said the Court:
The fact, therefore, that acts of Congress or treaties have not permitted
Chinese persons born out of this country to become citizens by naturaliza-
tion, cannot exclude Chinese persons born in this country from the opera-
tion of the broad and clear words of the Constitution, 'All persons born in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States.'187
184. Codification, supra note 82, at 78.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 79. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
187. 169 U.S. at 704.
The Act of May 6, 1882 provided: "Sec. 14. That hereafter no State court or court of
the United States shall admit Chinese to citizenship; and all laws in conflict with this act
are hereby repealed." (22 Stat. 61; 8 U.S.C. § 363).
See also the following cases where the person denied entry filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus and obtained a judicial decision on his citizenship: Gonzalez v. Williams,
192 U.S. 1 (1904); In re Nicola, 184 Fed. 322 (2nd Cir. 1911); Ex parte Griffin, 237
Fed. 445 (N.D.N.Y. 1916); United States ex rel. Anderson v. Howe, 231 Fed. 546
Many who petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus were not suc-
cessful. While the Supreme Court held that one who claimed citizen-
ship and made a showing that the claim was not frivolous, was enti-
tled, under the fifth amendment, to judicial review of the claim, the
mere fact that one claimed citizenship did not entitle the petitioner
to a judicial hearing unless it was established: that departmental offi-
cials had denied petitioner citizenship at a fair hearing; had acted in
some improper way; had abused their discretion; had made a finding
not supported by the evidence; or had applied an erroneous rule of
law. Absent such circumstances, the Supreme Court generally held
that the administrative decision regarding exclusion or deportation
was final and that it was the duty of the court to which application
was made for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to dismiss it.188
D. Other Remedies
Mandamus was also available to persons who were denied a right
or privilege as a United States citizen. The petitioner in Mackenzie
v. Hare was living in San Francisco and sought a writ of mandamus
to compel the California authorities to register her as a voter. The
authorities had denied her registration on grounds that she became
an alien by expatriating herself under the provisions of section 3 of
the Act of March 2, 1907 when she married a foreign national. 8 '
After a state court denied Mrs. MacKenzie's petition for the writ,
she appealed to the Supreme Court which reviewed her argument
that she remained a citizen despite marriage to an alien. The Court,
however, affirmed the judgment of the California court on the
grounds that she voluntarily brought herself within the purview of
the Act of March 2, 1907, which, the Court held, was a constitution-
ally sanctioned exercise of congressional power. 90
In Perkins v. Elg, Ms. Elg brought a bill in district court for a
declaratory decree establishing her status as an American citizen
and for injunctive relief against the Secretary of Labor and others.' 9'
The Department of Labor, which then had jurisdiction over the Im-
migration Service, held that Ms. Elg was an alien. The district court
entered a decree declaring her to be a United States citizen. An ap-
pellate court affirmed and the Secretary of Labor petitioned for cer-
tiorari. After reviewing Ms. Elg's claim to citizenship with great
care, the Supreme Court held that she was a United States citizen.
Before 1940, the right to judicial review was by no means assured.
(S.D.N.Y. 1916); Camardo v. Tillinghast, 29 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1928).
188. See Quon Quon Poy v. Johnson, 273 U.S. 352 (1926); and Ng Fung Ho v.
White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
189. 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
190. Id. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
191. 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
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Granted, there were avenues for relief, as elaborated above. But in
order to petition for a writ of habeas corpus or mandamus, or, after
1934, to seek a declaratory judgment, a person had to be in the
United States or attempting to enter. The remedies could only be
.pursued in the United States. Persons abroad who wished to contest
an adverse determination with respect to nationality were virtually
without means of relief. "What recourse," it has been asked,
did an American have who was informed by the Consul at Benin or Ran-
goon that he was no longer a citizen? The records do not disclose that any
provision was made for this type of case. The only feasible alternative for
such a person was to try to slip into the United States surreptitiously and,
when apprehended, sue out a writ of habeas corpus. Considering the impor-
tance of American citizenship, there were remarkably few procedural safe-
guards protecting the individual against loss of nationality by administrative
injustice."' 2
In 1904, Justice Brewer, who frequently dissented when the Su-
preme Court reversed the decisions of lower courts which had issued
writs of habeas corpus, deplored the absence of a statutory provision
for judicial review of claims of citizenship after denial by the admin-
istrative authorities. Dissenting in United States v. Sing Tuck, he
stated eloquently the case for judicial review:
We have called American citizenship an 'inestimable heritage,' Chin Bak
Kan v. United States, 186 U.S. 193, 200 [1902] and I cannot understand
why one who claims it should be denied the earliest possible hearing in the
courts upon the truth of his claim.
Why should any one who claims the right of citizenship be denied prompt
access to the courts? If it be an 'inestimable heritage,' can Congress deprive
one of the right to a judicial determination of its existence, and ought the
courts to unnecessarily avoid or postpone an inquiry thereof?""3
Thirty-five years would pass before Congress acted, but act it fi-
nally did. And for the last half-century, anyone, whether living here
or abroad, who contends that the administrative authorities erred in
holding that the expatriation was self- inflicted has had a right,
firmly anchored in statute and case law, to obtain from a federal
court full and fair consideration of that persons' claim of possible
administrative error. That right provides evidence that in the United
States, citizenship is indeed held to be "an inestimable heritable."
V. REPRISE
In 1965, two years before the Supreme Court decided Afroyim v.
Rusk, an eminent authority and practitioner expressed the view that
192. Roche, supra note 175, at 67-68.
193. U.S. v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161, 173 (1904) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
"the expatriation controversy [which] involves grave issues of na-
tional power and individual choice" was "an unfinished chronicle."
He continued:
[A]lIthough 175 years have elapsed since the adoption of the Constitution,
we have not yet arrived at a clear understanding of the nature and extent of
the power to expatriate American citizens. This lack of firm guidelines is
surprising in an area as fundamental as the title to American citizenship.
It is also significant that such uncertainty has persisted despite a constant
awareness of the problem and debate as to its resolution ...
The clash of ideas and the close divisions in the Supreme Court suggest
that this debate will continue and that the major issues are still largely
unsettled. The extent to which the national need, expressed in the consid-
ered judgment of Congress, can effect the termination of citizenship status
which the individual citizen does not wish to relinquish is still uncertain.
The attainment of a stable solution to this problem will probably be de-
ferred until its full implications are weighed by Congress, the courts and
the people.'"
Twenty-five years later, it would be fair to say that the expatria-
tion chronicle is as close to being finished as it is likely to be. The
"clash of ideas" in the Supreme Court, characterized by the sharp
divisions of the Court in Perez v. Brownell,' and Aroyim v.
Rusk,'96 ended with the Court's decision in Vance v. Terrazas, 19
where the Court "unanimously reiterate[d] the principle set forth in
Afroyirn v. Rusk that Congress may not deprive an American of
citizenship against his or her will, but may only effectuate the citi-
zen's own intention to renounce citizenship."198
Given the unanimity of the Supreme Court with respect to the
Constitution's unconditional grant of citizenship, it would be safe to
assume that neither the present Court nor a successor will repudiate
the Constitutional principles enunciated in Afroyim and Terrazas.
Thus, the remaining task in the judicial area is for the lower courts
to lay down rules that give effect to the Supreme Court's holding
that intent to relinquish citizenship may be expressed in words or
found as a fair inference from proven conduct. That task obviously is
not one of Constitutional dimensions.
Congress acknowledged in 1986 that the Constitution constrains
its power to legislate on expatriation. When Congress amended the
Immigration and Nationality Act to provide that loss of citizenship
shall only ensue if a statutory expatriative act is done voluntarily
with the intention of relinquishing citizenship, it brought the statute
into line with the constitutional rulings of the Supreme Court.19 It
194. Gordon, supra note 177, at 363-64. This survey of expatration in the United
States is masterly in its sweep and erudition.
195. 356 U.S. 44 (1958), overruled by 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
196. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
197. 444 U.S. 252 (1980), rehg denied, 445 U.S. 920.
198. Id. at 272 (Stevens, J., dissenting on other grounds).
199. Pub. L. 99-653, § 18(a), Nov. 14, 1986, 100 Stat. 3659. That section
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was as if history had come full circle in the century since one mem-
ber of the House denied the power of Congress to legislate
expatriation:
It is not the Government, but ... the individual, who has the right and the
only power of expatriation .... [I]t belongs and appertains to the citizen
and not to the Government; and it is the evidence of his election to exercise
his right, and not the power to control either the election or the right itself,
which is the legitimate subject matter of legislation. There has been, and
there can be, no legislation under our Constitution to control in any man-
ner, the right itself.200
In the executive branch, too, the precepts of Afroyim and Ter-
razas have been given purposeful expression in the new standard
adopted by the Department of State to determine what evidence will
and will not support a finding of intent to relinquish United States
citizenship.201 Greater consistency and predictability in determina-
tions of loss of nationality, and consequently fewer holdings of loss
and subsequent appeals to the Board of Appellate Review and the
courts, should be the fruit of thoughtful application of these
guidelines.
In this year of notable anniversaries in the history of expatriation
in the United States, one might confidently maintain that there is
now coherence in precept and a fair degree of consistency of practice
in the law of expatriation. The ferment in ideas that characterized
the nineteenth and a good part of this century has been succeeded by
a general harmony of view in government on the fundamental princi-
ples of expatriation.
amended section 349(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1481(a)
(1988) by inserting "voluntarily performing any of the following acts with the intention
of relinquishing United States nationality:" after "shall lose is nationality by";...
200. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 265 (1967) (quoting Representative Van
Trump of Ohio. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 1804 (1868)).
201. See supra note 159.

